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ABSTRACT 
LIFE AND SEOUL OF THE PARTY: SOUTH KOREA’S BRIEF 
OCCUPATION UNDER COMMUNIST NORTH KOREA 
by 
Catherine Rose Graham 
August 2017 
 
 This thesis analyzes the North Korean occupation of Seoul through the 
oral histories of the men and women who experienced the event. At the beginning 
of the Korean War, North Korean forces successfully captured and held the South 
Korean capital for three months. Despite the occupation’s interesting premise, it 
has received little attention from Korean War scholars. Interviews with the people 
who lived through the Korean War though, demonstrate that from their point of 
view, the occupation was a particularly significant part of their war experience. 
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CHAPTER I 
SEOUL TRAIN: KOREA DERAILED 
Introduction 
 For the Americans, the Korean War began with a blitzkrieg. On June 25th, 1950, 
the North Korean People’s Army rapidly invaded South Korea, driving the US-backed 
South Korean government to the south-eastern edge of the peninsula. Tensions on the 
peninsula had been brewing for months before the communist army made its move across 
the 38th parallel, with frequent skirmishes near the border hinting that a full-blown civil 
war between the two Koreas would be inevitable.1 Shocked yet relieved, American policy 
makers regarded the attack as a second Pearl Harbor, appreciating that it would allow US 
forces to finally confront the international tensions that had grown since WWII.2 Now 
that the North Korean army had invaded the south, the opponents of communism could 
finally unite under this new war and openly work to contain the looming communist 
threat.3 As the North Korean army continued to succeed though, and with half of the 
South Korean army either dead or missing, the glorious battle against the growing threat 
of communism had completely failed to materialize.4 Fleeing to the southeastern corner 
                                                 
1 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War: A History (New York: The Modern Library, 2011), 139. 
2 Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Volume II The Roaring of the Cataract 1947-
1950 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 627-628. 
3 Ibid., 628. 
4 Cumings, The Korean War: A History, 11. 
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of the peninsula, the defeated South Korean government left the majority of the country 
under North Korean control from late June until September 28th, 1950.5 
Communist forces fully controlled Seoul for roughly ninety days, enacting social 
and economic policies while also attempting to extinguish the city’s surviving anti-
communist elements; actions that served to prepare the Korean peninsula for 
reunification under communism. While American forces eventually helped the South 
Korean army retake Seoul, restoring the pre-war border, Seoul’s citizens remained 
shaken by the occupation. Interviews with Koreans who lived in the city during the war 
tend to highlight the occupation. Despite the occupation’s impact on Koreans during the 
war, popular narratives of the conflict rarely mention Seoul’s communist episode, leaving 
it a curiously unexplored piece of the war. This thesis argues that while the occupation of 
Seoul has been largely overlooked by historians, oral histories and documents from the 
period reveal that for many Koreans who lived through the conflict, the occupation was a 
particularly significant part of their wartime experience.6 
As the war broke out, the occupation that followed stunned Americans and South 
Koreans alike, as they watched Seoul fall within days. While historians continue to pass 
over the occupation, oral histories on the war seem to frequently stress it in their personal 
narratives. These recollections demonstrate how the sudden takeover of Seoul disrupted 
many of their daily lives and brought chaos to the region. As the communists descended 
on Seoul, foreigners, politicians, and families fled southward to escape the dangers of 
                                                 
5 John W. Riley and Wilbur Schramm, The Reds Take a City: The Communist Occupation of Seoul 
with Eyewitness Accounts (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951), 4-5. 
6 These sources have either been translated into English or were originally written in English.  
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occupation. Although Koreans were now the ones occupying Korea, rather than foreign 
entities such as the Japanese or Americans, the North Korean army was perceived as an 
enemy to fellow Koreans with contrasting ideologies. Those labeled as rightists were 
imprisoned and executed and Seoul’s citizens were expected to embrace the invading 
government as a liberator. While the occupation visibly interrupted their daily lives, the 
common citizens who remained in Seoul adapted to the war-time situation, forced to 
adjust to communist expectations and demands. While some citizens genuinely supported 
the communist ideology and others were more focused on survival than voicing 
discontent with communism, the occupation had greatly complicated life for everyone 
living in Seoul.  
As an introduction, this chapter outlines the Korean War’s historical context by 
narrating the events that led up to the occupation and demonstrating how Korean history 
influenced the situation and its eventual outcomes. This chapter also examines the 
historical debates surrounding the first year of the conflict, as they continue to impact the 
popular narrative of the Korean War. Lastly, this chapter seeks to emphasize the 
historical significance of the occupation of Seoul, demonstrating that its analysis is 
necessary to comprehend the greater narrative of the Korean War. With these goals in 
mind, this chapter demonstrates how the Cold War lingers, as historians continue to 
overlook a period that persists within the memories of the war’s survivors.  
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Korea’s Independent Legacy: Korean War Context 
By the 1950s, “occupation” by a foreign force was not a new experience for the 
people of the Korean peninsula. While Korea had been an independent kingdom during 
the Choson dynasty (1392-1910), it had been a tributary state to China during the both the 
Ming and the Qing dynasties. After the Manchu invasion of the Korean peninsula and the 
rise of the Qing empire in the seventeenth century, Korea submitted to a hierarchical 
tributary system under China. Historians have recently demonstrated that this tributary 
system was especially humiliating for the Confucian elites of the Choson dynasty, as they 
had traditionally looked down on the northern nomads who they were now forced to pay 
tribute.7 While this system differed from the country’s later imperial experience as a 
colonized state, the loss of autonomy in both situations was frustrating to many Koreans. 
Some reformists in Korea during the late nineteenth century celebrated Qing dynasty 
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, as they viewed the Qing dynasty’s loss of 
autonomy to Japan as Korea’s moment to secure the state’s independence in the new 
global context of colonial competition.8 With Korea’s tributary relationship with the Qing 
imperium now severed, reformists encouraged Korean independence, inspiring nationalist 
movements on the peninsula.9 Yet the modern imperialism that Japan imposed on the 
                                                 
7 Previous dynasties on the Korean peninsula had also been involved in tributary relations with the 
powerful dynasties of China but in this case, the submission to the Manchus was seen as particularly 
humiliating to Neo-Confucian Korean elites due to the sino-centric Confucian ideology that viewed 
nomadic groups such as the Manchus as barbarians. For more information, see JaHyun Kim Haboush, The 
Great East Asian War and the Birth of the Korean Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016.) 
8 Andre Schmid, Korea Between Empires, 1895-1919 (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2002), 3. 
9 Ibid. 
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country was completely different from what Koreans had experienced with the tributary 
system in the pre-modern era.  
Rather than achieving independence after China’s defeat, Korea came under a 
strict occupation under Japan when it annexed Korea in 1910. Now in control of Korea, 
Japan employed colonial projects (such as the “Company Law” project and the “Land 
Investigations” project) that systematically and negatively changed the way Koreans 
could own land and run businesses.10 The Korean elites who rejected Japan’s colonial 
rule did so by supporting nationalist liberation, which became a core movement of 
resistance to colonial Japan. As Koreans became increasingly unhappy with the colonial 
government, Japan strained to effectively suppress the various anti-colonial liberation 
movements. By the end of WWII, as the Japanese occupation ended abruptly, Korea’s 
liberation movements remained active and ready to seize the country. 
With leading Korean political elites focusing on nationalist liberation, and 
decolonization occurring worldwide after WWII, many Korean citizens anticipated the 
return of Korea as an independent state. Post-war politics thwarted those hopeful for 
independence, and the country was placed under a joint occupation that consequentially 
split the country ideologically.11 As the US and the USSR retained significant control 
over the peninsula through the joint occupation, the possibility of reunification weakened 
as the two major powers sought to control the political situation in the occupied regions. 
                                                 
10 James L. McClain, A Modern History of Japan. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002: 
341. 
11 William Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 11-13, Kindle. 
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With the country divided by the joint occupation, the Koreans who had longed for an 
independent but unified state, were deeply disappointed.  
The division and occupation of the peninsula obviously played an important role 
in triggering the Korean War. As Koreans strained against the Post-WWII system and 
found their attempts to implement the political system of their choice impeded, the 
division of the country began to cement. Stueck’s statement that the “Soviet-US 
occupation cast dark clouds over Korean hopes” demonstrates the widespread 
disappointment felt by Koreans hoping for independence. While Koreans had initially 
welcomed Japan’s defeat, the joint occupation disillusioned many, especially as 
American and Soviet troops harassed locals.12 While American soldiers did treat Korean 
locals more kindly than their Soviet counterparts did, policy makers from both countries 
manipulated and purged the Korean political parties that did not align with the occupying 
nation’s dominant ideology.13 When it came time for the occupying nations to discuss 
plans for Korea’s new government, neither side could agree on a plan. The Soviet Union 
was reluctant to “risk a unified national government free from Soviet control.”14 
Meanwhile, the United States had become increasingly intent on curbing communism and 
promoting right-wing parties. Reluctantly, US policy makers allowed Syngman Rhee’s 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 19. 
13 Ibid. 
14 William Stueck, The Korean War: An International History (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 21. 
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party to suppress political opponents, hoping that this would at least thwart Korea from 
reuniting exclusively under a communist government.15  
By the end of the 1940s, through the “guidance” of the occupying nations, the 
peninsula now contained two governments with conflicting political systems. The 
government in the south became deeply capitalist, while the northern government had 
openly embraced communism. The potential for a civil war now loomed over Korea since 
the “Korean War could break out only when the discrepant post-colonialities were 
straight-jacketed into two antagonistic nation-state building projects that were at once 
hegemonic in aspirations and constrained in capacities.”16 In other words, the US and the 
Soviet Union had driven the region into civil war through their efforts to mold the 
peninsula into a government that their respective state would benefit from. Despite the 
initial excitement many Koreans felt as the Japanese occupation officially ended, the 
Soviets and the Americans impeded true Korean independence and led the peninsula 
directly into an internationally involved civil war. Their refusal to cooperate perpetuated 
the peninsula’s division.  
As the Soviets and the Americans began to move their forces out of the Korean 
Peninsula, and the governments they had cultivated were left behind, the inevitable 
fighting between the two Koreas escalated. Initially, while working within the United 
Nations, the US and USSR had agreed to establish a joint council to negotiate the 
                                                 
15 Jae-Jung Suh, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea: Confronting War, Colonialism, and 
Intervention in the Asia Pacific,” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (December 2010): 509-510. 
16 Ibid., 505. 
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political outcome of the peninsula.17 Known as the Joint Commission, its purpose was to 
guide Korea’s occupiers on how to best facilitate Korea’s independence over the next 
decade.18 The Joint Commission would primarily guide the US and USSR towards 
preparing the peninsula for the general election that would formally (and finally) reunite 
Korea. Although the Joint Commission began meeting as early as the winter of 1946, the 
conflicting ideologies between the USSR and the US led to an inability to settle on 
matters pertaining to Korea’s independence. Even as early as the first meeting of the Joint 
Commission, the Soviet Union harshly rejected American plans to begin integrating 
South and North Korea, alluding to the growing Cold War situation as well as Korea’s 
future as two separate nations.19 Four years later, little had changed regarding a unified 
Korea. If anything, the division between North and South remained strong as the conflict 
continued. 
WWII in Europe left the US government noticeably anxious as communist revolts 
broke out due to the power vacuums caused by the war’s end.20 The US responded to the 
growth of communism by offering aid to war-torn countries, making it clear to the world 
that America intended to contain the growing ideology. As a result, the Soviets became 
increasingly hostile towards the Joint Commission.21 With the two governments involved 
in the joint occupation now at odds, it is unsurprising that the plans for unification 
devolved into a civil war. As the US and the Soviet Union bickered, conservative Korean 
                                                 
17 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 13. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 14. 
20 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 41-42. 
21 Ibid., 42-43. 
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politician Syngman Rhee took advantage of the Cold War to transform South Korea into 
a capitalist nation. 
Attempting to resolve the violence between the two governments as skirmishes 
broke out near the 38th parallel, the United Nations offered to sponsor a general election 
for the peninsula, while also promising to prepare the elected party to govern the 
reunified Korea. The Americans endorsed the UN proposal, but the Soviets boycotted the 
plan for a general election, anticipating a disadvantageous outcome since two-thirds of 
the Korean population were currently under American control.22 Because of the Soviet 
boycott, separate elections were held, officially dividing the peninsula into two. Unhappy 
with the decision to hold separate elections, most of South Korea’s moderate and left-
wing politicians refused to participate, allowing conservative groups (mostly supporting 
Syngman Rhee) to win.23 On May 10, 1948, South Korea held the elections that would 
establish it as the capitalist, demoncratic Republic of Korea (ROK,) while North Korea 
became the communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) following its 
own August 25th elections.24 As the Cold War began to intensify, both North and South 
Korea became entrenched in the international politics surrounding the conflict. The UN 
had done little to alleviate growing tensions and it instead became the stage for the 
international aspects of the conflict, as the Soviet Union and US flexed muscles 
throughout every attempt to negotiate Korea’s outcome. As Syngman Rhee lashed out 
                                                 
22 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 26. 
23 Stueck, Rethinking the Korean War, 42. 
24 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 26-27. 
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against the Koreans who opposed his regime in the South, and as North Korea rejected 
the legitimacy of the Southern government, relations between the two Koreas worsened.25  
By the summer of 1950, the two Koreas had been engaged in sporadic skirmishes 
at the “temporary” boundary of the 38th parallel for months, leaving it inevitable that one 
side would provoke the other into a full-out war. Although the June 25th attack took 
South Korea by surprise, the world had expected an eventual outbreak of violence on the 
peninsula. On the morning of June 25, 1950, North Koreans marched into South Korean 
territory and began to hold towns.26  While few were shocked by North Korea’s attack on 
the south, it was the swift defeat of the ROK army that stunned many, as the communists 
successfully captured Seoul with 37,000 soldiers.27 By the end of June, the capital of 
South Korea had been completely overtaken by the North, and Seoul entered a three-
month period of North Korean occupation. 
Faced with the daunting task of establishing communism within a previously 
capitalist city, the DPRK found one of its greatest strategies within Korea’s past. Korea’s 
legacy of liberation movements provided the communist government with a foundation 
for establishing its own legitimacy in Seoul. The occupying government referred to the 
Korean War as “the Fatherland Liberation War” stressing that the DPRK was in Seoul to 
free fellow Koreans from the shackles of foreign control.28 Seoul itself was especially 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 27. 
26 Alan J. Levine, Stalin’s Last War: Korea and the Approach to World War III (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland & Company, Inc, 2005), 498, Kindle. 
27 Bruce Cumings, The Korean War, 11. 
28 Charles K. Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak: North Korea and the World, 1950-1992 (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2013), 14, Kindle. 
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important to the North Korean government, as it had been Korea’s capital for centuries, 
offering the DPRK considerable symbolic legitimacy towards controlling a reunified 
Korea.  
After decades of subjugation under a foreign power, Koreans now faced a new 
(and somewhat bizarre) occupation shaped by a communist ideology that blended well 
with the peninsula’s nationalism. Occupied Seoul was spared from great revolts similar to 
those seen in Japan’s occupation of the country, as communist forces were able to 
harness local nationalism by promoting their status as fellow Koreans. Even with this 
advantage, the DPRK actively worked to gain local approval. In order to further appeal to 
South Koreans, the DPRK initially avoided employing force against Seoul’s citizens.29 
As a journalist who had been in Seoul during the war explained, “At the beginning of the 
occupation, they were very kind to the people, saying that they would embrace all except 
the reactionaries . . . It was a well-known fact that they were well trained to win the 
hearts of the people.”30 The communists worked to win-over South Korean support by 
openly attempting to address the many grievances South Koreans had held against 
Syngman Rhee’s government.31 Since there had been widespread discontent in Korea 
regarding the US and South Korean government’s re-employment of former collaborators 
of the Japanese empire, North Korea was able to gain support in Seoul by purging those 
who had been involved with the Japanese occupiers.32 Further facilitating their takeover 
                                                 
29 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 669. 
30 The Reds Take a City, 66. 
31 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 24-26. 
32 Dong-Choon Kim, “The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to 
Achieve Justice in South Korea,” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 4 (December 2010): 530. 
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of Seoul, The North Korean government’s stance on land reform and gender equality 
impressed South Koreans.33 The communists enticed women in Seoul by promising 
employment opportunities while also catching the interest of tenant farmers by explaining 
their plans to redistribute land.34 By 1950, enough South Koreans had become 
disenchanted and frustrated with the ROK government that the communists were able to 
occupy Seoul with relative ease. 
The occupation of Seoul meant that it was now Koreans who were occupying 
Korea rather than foreigners, and this distinction allowed the North Koreans to use the 
general bitterness against the Japanese, while also using the general disappointment with 
the failure to reunify, to their advantage. Syngman Rhee’s efforts to suppress South 
Korea’s growing support for leftist political movements irritated many Koreans, as the 
government became increasingly anti-communist and nationalistic.35 Due to the US 
government’s concerned with the containment of communism, Rhee was able to stifle the 
proposed plans for land reform in the south.36 With many Koreans disappointed by the 
ROK, the communists were able to rule Seoul with considerable cooperation from the 
locals.37 The foreign occupations had been instrumental in cementing the ideologies of 
the newly divided states, and it was the consequences of the split Soviet-American rule 
that set the stage for the ideological battle that has lasted for over half a century. 
 
                                                 
33 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 26. 
34 The Reds Take a City, 35. 
35 Stueck, The Korean War: An International History, 23-24. 
36 Ibid., 29. 
37 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 669. 
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The Forgotten War’s Forgotten Occupation: Debates in Korean War Historiography 
While the Korean War’s historical context helps paint a detailed picture of the 
events that surrounded the occupation, the topic’s historiographical debates hint towards 
why this period has received such little attention in spite of its significance to those who 
lived through it. Despite its importance to the Korean War, the occupation of Seoul has 
received little attention from historians. From the American and South Korean point of 
view, the occupation signified the terrifying yet brief period of the war where the enemy 
nearly conquered all of Korea, threatening to transform the entire peninsula into a 
communist state. Despite the magnitude of the situation, and the occupation’s substantial 
consequences, the event is considerably overshadowed by the conflict’s other periods and 
themes. Works on the Korean War seem to jump from the beginning of the conflict to the 
American victory at Inchon, typically mentioning the occupation of Seoul in less than a 
paragraph. The relative obscurity of such a dramatic and historically significant event is 
intriguing.  
It is the missing North Korean sources that historians seem to frequently cite to 
explain the occupation’s obscurity.38 While the isolation of North Korea has undeniably 
affected information regarding the DPRK’s assault on the south, this explanation has also 
allowed scholars to shift the blame onto the current North Korean government. While the 
current political situation does leave many details unobtainable, there are still valuable 
and credible sources that explain the occupation, at least from the South Korean point of 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 670. 
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view. Some of the most vital sources on the occupation have been the oral histories of 
those who directly experienced the communist takeover. Unfortunately, there is an 
absence of oral histories that detail the occupation from the pro-communist point of view. 
The availability and the content of these interviews have been largely influenced by Cold 
War politics.  
Filtered through the eyes of those who were in charge during the conflict, the 
story of the Korean War has been detailed through an emphasis on the political and 
military powers involved. Even the terms ‘Cold War’ and ‘puppet war’ illustrate how the 
conflict has been interpreted through the agency of the foreign powers involved. 
According to popular works on the topic, the significant actors in the Korean War were 
men such as President Truman, Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Syngman Rhee, MacArthur, and the 
other important policy makers who made the conflict’s major decisions. As the policy 
makers throughout the Korean War, it is the stories of these powerful men and their 
perceptions of the conflict that have most notably influenced works on the subject. Even 
now, as the historiographical scene has shifted so dramatically over the past few decades 
and as numerous archives have become more accessible, historians have only slightly 
changed the Korean War narrative. Works on the subject have simply moved away from 
Stalin and Truman’s views, and focused instead on other policy makers, such as Kim Il 
Sung. These authors attempt to pull North Korean (and sometimes South Korean) agency 
15 
 
out of the actions of the communist leader and his inner circle.39  With the elites still the 
main focus of Korean War historians, topics like the occupation remain off of their radar. 
While there are few scholarly works on the occupation, the historical debates 
regarding the beginning of the war give some insight into academic attitudes regarding 
the period the occupation took place in. One of the most relevant debates to the 
occupation, regards the seemingly simple topic of the date used to signify the beginning 
of the war. Recent revisionist authors have begun to challenge the official starting date of 
June 25, 1950. This date has been integral to the study of the occupation of Seoul, as it 
also marks the beginning of the communist effort to seize the city. The choice of this date 
has been particularly controversial due to the assertion that it automatically pins the 
blame of the war onto the North Korean government.40 Some historians have suggested 
that the June date implies that the conflict started from the North Korean move into the 
south when in reality it was a much more complex situation within a brewing civil war. 
By automatically portraying the communists as the aggressors, the occupation is just a 
small detail as the rest of the narrative moves its attention to Seoul’s eventual liberation 
from its captors.  
Many of the date’s critics demonstrate that the debate is much more than a 
scholarly exercise in splitting hairs. The debate also helps to expose contemporary 
academic attitudes regarding the beginning of an ideologically contentious event. 
Depending on the historian’s position, works on the conflict describe it as either a civil 
                                                 
39 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 14. 
40 Jae-Jung Suh, “Truth and Reconciliation in South Korea,” 507. 
16 
 
war, an international war, or a combination of the two. The complexity of the occupation 
of Seoul is difficult to grasp without first understanding the historical debates that have 
stemmed from the revisionists’ reminder that fighting between the two Koreas occurred 
for months before the traditional date. The June 25th date has largely concealed colonial 
Japan’s impact on the war, and working beyond the date uncovers deeper levels of the 
conflict’s complexity, by broadening the frame of the war to the colonial impact on the 
Korean peninsula and to the skirmishes that led to North Korea’s southward advance. The 
traditional date clearly represents a significant point in the peninsula’s history, but its 
usage as a starting point has hindered full historical comprehension of the conflict.  
The debate over this date has brought to the war’s historiography a new level of 
complexity, one that had been needed to study situations like the occupation. As one of 
the top historians on the war, Bruce Cumings’ assertion that the “Korean War did not 
begin on June 25, 1950,” has become so controversial that the quote even appears on his 
Wikipedia page.41 Well-known as a revisionist, Cumings has contributed to this date by 
arguing that the war actually began a year earlier in 1949. Cumings stresses that civil 
wars “do not start: they come. They originate in multiple causes, with blame enough to 
go around for everyone.”42 Demonstrating how impossible an exact starting date is, he 
suggests that the first signs of conflict began in 1945 as the country was artificially 
divided, and he further mentions that guerilla warfare began in November of 1948.43 
Understanding the need to pinpoint a time period for the beginning of the war, Cumings 
                                                 
41 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), 238. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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concludes that increased fighting began in Korea early in 1949. Although Cumings points 
to a number of small conflicts prior to June of 1950 to justify his position, he seems most 
comfortable with the idea that the Korean War began in 1949. He continually stresses 
that it was the end of the civil war in China that allowed the Korean skirmishes to 
intensify into an actual war by 1949.44 Prior to this date, Korean communists had been 
abroad helping the Communist Party of China achieve victory in its own civil war.45 As 
the Chinese Civil War ended, communist Koreans returned home, ready to aid North 
Korea.  
While the Chinese Civil War explains why the skirmishes took several years to 
erupt into war and pushes any possible beginning for the Korean War closer to the 
traditionally accepted date, Cumings’ rejection of it stresses his focus on the conflict as 
one that began as a civil war. While Cumings uses the traditional date to mark the 
escalation of violence, he uses his rejection of it as the beginning of the war to emphasize 
the skirmishes that led up to North Korea’s victories. His two-volume work The Origins 
of the Korean War painstakingly details these skirmishes, as the international community 
both watched in horror and attempted to influence the two Koreas. It is not until 625 
pages into the second volume that Cumings reaches June 25, 1950, demonstrating the 
author’s firm belief that the war began much earlier.  
William Stueck has utilized the traditional date in a similar manner to Cumings. 
Stueck seems to acknowledge that while the months leading up to the traditional date 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 242. 
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consisted of the two Korean armies fighting near the 38th parallel, it is on June 25th that 
the North Korean army officially crossed the temporary boundary and began to formally 
occupy lands and cities under South Korean control.46 Unlike Cumings though, Stueck 
avoids commenting any further on the date debate, instead simply naming his first 
chapter in one of his Korean War books “From Civil War to International Conflict: 25-30 
June 1950” to demonstrate his opinion on what the traditional date represents. To authors 
like Stueck, there was a Korean civil war occurring prior to June 25th, but it is the 
international nature of the conflict that represents what has been known as the Korean 
War. By understanding both aspects of the Korean War (international and civil) 
historians are able to extract Korean agency from the events that have traditionally been 
overlooked, such as the pre-war skirmishes and the later occupation of Seoul.  
Although Cumings has worked to deemphasize the international side of the 
conflict and Stueck has promoted its international qualities, Charles K. Armstrong has 
utilized both the international and civil war narratives by describing how the relationships 
between both Korean powers and their international allies influenced the decisions of the 
Korean policy makers. Armstrong does use the June 25th date, expressing his belief that 
the North Koreans began the war as a preemptive strike against the south.47 He admits 
that “there was already a de facto war going on between North and South Korea well 
before June 25” but he sticks to using the traditional date throughout his works.48 To 
                                                 
46 Stueck, The Korean War, 10.  
47 Armstrong, Tyranny of the Weak, 12. 
48 Ibid. 
19 
 
Armstrong, June 25th seems to represent the day North Korea transformed the 
peninsula’s civil war into a vital conflict of the Cold War. 
While the previously mentioned authors have focused more broadly, authors such 
as Chen Jian, who have narrowed their focus to one country and its role in the Korean 
War, primarily use the June 25th date. With the war’s official outbreak catching their 
attention, leaders like Mao Zedong were forced to recognize and react to the situation, 
signifying June 25th as the beginning of the international aspect of the war. Chen’s 
opening paragraph on the Korean War begins with “Sunday, June 25, 1950” but while 
introducing the beginning of the war, Chen clarifies that it was not until June 27th that the 
UN condemned North Korea’s actions and the Americans began sending forces to 
“neutralize the area.”49 It is actually several days after these events, as Chen explains, that 
“the Korean War quickly changed into an international crisis.”50 While historians may 
justify their continued use of the traditional date by pointing out the international shift, it 
is telling that foreign powers actually entered the conflict days later. With this in mind, it 
is hard to separate the date from popular perceptions of North Korean aggression 
triggering the war. Despite revisionist attempts to call attention to the earlier skirmishes 
on the peninsula, the continued use of the June 25th date continues to emphasize North 
Korea as the aggressor and to obscure South Korean belligerence.  
Jae-Jung Suh provides one of the harsher critiques the use of the June 25th date, 
referring to it as an aspect of the war’s memory that automatically “identifies the West as 
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the savior of Korea.”51 Suh asserts that the traditional date “lifts the Korean War out of a 
complex history, and places it in the realm of state-sanctioned myth, a realm much more 
conducive to policing and cyclical rituals of anticommunist patriotism.”52 According to 
Suh, the date has given the state power to influence the popular narrative of the war, a 
point that demonstrates how drastically small details can impact the legacy of such a 
politically charged conflict. Suh further explains that the date portrays South Koreans as 
the “innocent victims” of the aggressive communists.53 Suh even suggests that it erases 
the colonial origins of the war, by strictly narrowing the scope of the war.54 Suh’s 
criticism suggests that the popular narrative of the war has been shaped by reducing its 
context, a point that hints towards why topics such as the occupation have been 
disregarded. The occupation likely sits outside the “state-sanctioned myth” as topics more 
flattering to the US and South Korea have been emphasized.  
While Suh suggests a conscious effort to promote the traditional date to control 
the popular narrative, Armstrong points to a different aspect of Cold War politics. 
Armstrong reveals that the lack of access to Soviet documents prior to the 1990s led 
historians to view the beginning of the Korean War as a “carefully preconceived 
conspiracy among communist leaders.” 55 To historians outside of the Eastern Bloc, the 
early North Korean victories were understood to have been the result of a Soviet plot. 
Without access to Soviet documents, scholars were missing much of the information 
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revisionists such as Cumings have used to argue against the date. Up until the end of the 
Cold War, there was simply little evidence against the idea that the Korean War began 
the day the communists poured over the 38th parallel and captured Seoul.  
 While the June 25th debate has stimulated discussion of the beginning of the 
Korean War, information regarding the occupation of Seoul remains lacking. The war’s 
most common narrative seems to begin with the North Korean invasion of South Korea, 
while others begin earlier with the conclusion of WWII and the subsequent joint 
occupation of Korea. Cumings has heavily criticized works that dive straight into June 
1950, lamenting that “in most of the literature, the war for the South resembles a simple 
game of positional warfare: The North ‘struck like a cobra,’… rolled rather quickly to the 
Pusan perimeter, tried but failed to punch through American lines, and then was defeated 
by MacArthur’s brilliant landing at Inchon.”56 Cumings’ complaint is evident, as topics 
such as the occupation have clearly received little to no attention from scholars.  
Although revisionists in recent years have done notable work examining the 
origins of the war, the occupation of Seoul continues to be almost completely absent from 
the narrative. Historians seem to keep the occupation within the description of the North 
Korean invasion, rather than making any attempts to unpack it and understand exactly 
what occurred during those three months of North Korean rule. While the historiography 
focuses so intently on the debate surrounding the debate, the occupation (and its lack of 
discussion) remains overlooked. Even William Stueck, in his examination of the war’s 
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international nature, only briefly mentions the North Korean effort to takeover Seoul, 
completely bypassing the actual occupation.57  
Despite devoting considerable attention to the events that led to the Korean War, 
author Alan J. Levine also falls into the positional warfare trap, as he details the military 
achievements of the North Korean invasion then rushes to the much later battles 
involving the Pusan Perimeter. Levine does briefly spend a paragraph touching on the 
North Korean occupation, but it is only to criticize communist atrocities during their 
control of Seoul.58 Curiously, Levine fails to mention the similar atrocities committed 
during the same period by the South Korean and American troops, who massacred such a 
large number of civilians that some historians have begun referring to the summer of 
1950 as the “Summer of Terror.”59 While the occupation was hardly without violence, it 
is particularly problematic when authors only use its existence to focus on the negative 
aspects of the communist government. Very few authors detail the occupation, instead 
choosing to briefly mention it as a low point in the war for South Korea and its allies.    
 While it is understandable that authors focusing on other aspects of the war have 
circumvented discussing the occupation of Seoul, it is surprising that Cumings, the 
champion of North Korean agency in the war, has written so little on the occupation. 
Even within his multi-volume work The Origins of the Korean War, Cumings barely 
discusses the occupation. Cumings spends hundreds of pages explaining the events that 
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occurred leading up to the war. Cumings focuses so heavily on recounting the initial 
battles between North Koreans and the UN and South Korean forces that even his books 
typically jump from the North Korean attack into the battles at Inchon Landing.60 
When Cumings does speak about the occupation, it is very briefly. Considering 
though that the book has over 1,218 pages focusing on the origins and the early months 
of the war, the few pages the occupation are disappointing. Rather than trying to explore 
the occupation itself, Cumings uses it to set the stage for his discussion on guerilla 
warfare in the South. Much of the short section that includes actual content for the 
occupation focuses more on the violence that occurred between the opposing armies.61 
The short section does provide some precious details regarding the North Korean strategy 
to govern Seoul, but there is little if any information concerning the day to day 
experience of those under the occupation. Cumings’ few details regarding the 
consequences of the occupation reveal that despite the lack of information on it, the 
occupation of Seoul was a significant period of the Korean War.  
Cumings’ noble efforts to uncover less explored aspects of the Korean War does 
expose the reality that sources on topics such as the occupation are difficult to find. 
Cumings explains that it was documents left behind in the later (and briefer) communist 
occupation of 1951 that have provided historians with the little information available on 
the North Korean point of view.62 The second occupation had been so turbulent and brief 
that the communists had been forced to leave behind a small sample of their plans for 
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communist Seoul.63 These documents have allowed historians to study the North Korean 
point of view, but they only provide a small amount of insight into the occupation. With 
sources regarding the occupation so difficult to obtain, it is unsurprising that historians 
have avoided the topic. Cumings is left relying on his own anecdotal evidence while 
discussing the occupation, commenting that he “seems always to be running into Koreans 
who say the experience was terrible, while also saying that they successfully hid out 
during the entire three months.”64 While it is discouraging that detailed sources are 
difficult to obtain, Cumings’ anecdote suggests that the key to understanding the 
occupation of Seoul, is within oral histories.  
 
Primary Sources: Hints from the 1950s 
 Historiographical debates concerning the Korean War have tended to marginalize 
ordinary citizens. With works so often focusing on military feats and leadership 
decisions, it is unsurprising that topics like the occupation of Seoul have received so little 
attention. Most of South Korea’s government officials had fled Seoul by the time the 
communists entered the city, leaving the experience of the occupation to the ordinary 
citizens left behind. While it had been the leadership that set the stage for the greater 
Korean War conflict, it was primarily the common citizens who were left to experience 
the communist takeover. Oral histories reveal that Korean survivors are willing to discuss 
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the occupation but the problem is that few scholars seem interested in delving into this 
particular aspect of the war.  
Prior to the cease-fire, it seems that scholars were actually interested in studying 
the occupation. The Reds Take a City was published in 1951, only one year after the 
occupation began.65 Over sixty years later, The Reds Take a City remains the only work 
that focuses on the occupation. The occupation evidently held more significance to 
academia during the war, when the growing threat of communism seemed more 
imminent to Americans. As the Korean War developed into a stalemate though, exciting 
periods such as the occupation seemed less important to policy makers and scholars, who 
shifted their focus towards subjects such as the armistice negotiations. With the 
occupation’s significance diminished by the political atmosphere, the topic remains 
largely unexplored.  
While The Reds Take a City continues to stand as one of the only English 
language works on the topic, its contribution to the topic is surprisingly excellent. Despite 
being outdated and humorously submerged in anti-communist rhetoric, the work’s 
brilliant use of oral interviews provides an important clue for twenty-first century 
scholars attempting to divulge information about the occupation. The book’s ability to 
stay relevant for after half a century is largely due to its abundance of personal accounts 
regarding the occupation. Considering the topic’s obscurity and the historical value of 
The Reds Take a City, it is evident that the occupation of Seoul can appropriately be 
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studied by employing the use of the oral histories of those who experienced the event. 
This thesis makes extensive use of the interviews included in the book, but more 
importantly, it will also further the original author’s efforts to uncover details about the 
occupation through oral histories. While historians continue to overlook the occupation of 
Seoul, it is the memories of those who lived through the communist takeover that offer 
precious insight into the event.  
While the obscurity of the occupation can be easily attributed to the isolationist 
policies of North Korea as well as the American tendency to promote its successes while 
concealing its failures, it is still surprising that historians have largely ignored such a 
significant period. While choosing to focus instead on the war’s outbreak, or the success 
of Inchon landing, historians have missed an opportunity to explore the three-month 
event that characterized much of the conflict. The following chapter seeks to uncover the 
details of the occupation through the memories of those who experienced it. Simply put, 
The Reds Take a City has held a monopoly on the story of the occupation of Seoul for far 
too long.  
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CHAPTER II 
COMMUNIST SOUP FOR THE SEOUL 
While the occupation of Seoul has been largely absent from the general narrative 
of the Korean War, the accounts of those who experienced it reveal a period where 
Koreans were thrust directly into the center of an ideologically driven conflict. Many of 
the oral histories examined by this thesis demonstrate how significant the war was to their 
experience, as they often explain in detail their reactions to the communist takeover of 
Seoul. It was these ordinary citizens of Seoul who experienced the consequences of the 
war as their homes became the stage for the worsening international conflict. From their 
point of view, it was neither the war’s military feats or its political issues that would 
shape their personal memories of the war. Scholarly works may continue to overlook the 
occupation, but these oral histories make it clear that historians have failed to fairly 
weigh the events that stood out to ordinary citizens.  
By understanding the details of the occupation through the experiences of 
common Koreans, it is easier to comprehend and analyze the nature of a civil war created 
by the Cold War, as ideology and outside forces combined to alter the peninsula, making 
it two contrastingly different nations. Without American and Soviet influences, the 
Korean peninsula would have likely initiated its own elections, and potentially avoided a 
civil war. It had, after all, been the consequences of the brewing Cold War that divided 
and encouraged such a strict ideological split between the two Koreas. While the elites 
were engrossed in the conflict’s politics and ideologies, Korea’s common citizens 
focused on survival. While the correspondences between elites have allowed historians to 
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analyze the war from the top, it is the recollections of Seoul’s common citizens that 
accurately demonstrate many of the conflicts missing details.   
The Northern occupiers came into Seoul to not only control the former capital of 
the south, but to also implement the new state’s form of communism. Seoul’s status as a 
capital of a largely capitalist state meant that the city remained full of people who had 
opposed communism but were unable to flee the occupation. Further complicating the 
situation, Seoul’s status as the capital of Korea, even during the Japanese occupation, 
meant that the city remained home to a large number of men and women who had 
collaborated with the recently defeated Japanese regime.1 American occupation forces 
had allowed many former collaborators to remain in powerful positions in the south, 
which disappointed and angered many Koreans.2 Many of the Koreans who embraced 
communist political parties did so because they rejected former collaborators.3 Because 
they promised to punish former collaborators, the North Korean government came into 
the city as a liberator to those who demanded justice for Japan’s transgressions.4 With 
such a large number of local citizens who had been in positions that conflicted with the 
ideology of the occupying government, North Korean forces were pressured to confront 
more than those who were simply loyal to the capitalist Republic of Korea. Forced to flee 
south to avoid imprisonment and in some cases death, many former collaborators, 
wealthy businessmen, and anti-communist politicians survived the occupation of Seoul, 
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leaving memoirs and interviews that have served as an excellent source of information on 
the event. 
Recent oral history projects have undoubtedly enriched the study of the Korean 
War, providing a richer understanding of unfamiliar events such as the occupation. The 
oral histories available demonstrate the complex and problematic positions that the 
occupation placed many individuals and families into. While this thesis discusses this in 
depth as it explores a handful of interviews, it is worth noting that many of these sources 
have been heavily influenced by South Korea’s anti-communist rhetoric. Even the 
interviews with Korean-Americans have been influenced by the on-going politics of the 
Korean War.  
Oral histories, even now, are almost exclusively from South Koreans or those who 
defected from or left North Korea, leaving the voices of those who support North Korea 
absent. While some of these circumstances are due to North Korea’s tight control over 
information leaving the country, much of it has also been intentionally manipulated by 
the South Korean government. The legacy of the Korean War as an ideological conflict is 
evident as the South Korean government continues to send North Korean defectors to a 
re-education camp before they can freely reside in the south. While these camps, such as 
Hanawon, are promoted by South Korea and its allies as facilities simply focused on 
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preparing former North Koreans for life in a more fast-paced, capitalist society, the 
camp’s existence is both disconcerting and enlightening.5  
Hanawon has only been in use since 1999, yet its existence demonstrates how the 
ideology-driven nature of the Korean War continues to affect general information on the 
conflict. Before Hanawon, such a camp was not even necessary due to the military 
government that controlled South Korea from 1960 until the early 1990s; in such a 
dangerous political climate, South Koreans and North Korean defectors were unable to 
safely express sympathy or even remote support for North Korea.  Considering that many 
defectors have also received government stipends from the openly anti-communist state, 
it also seems likely that many of the refugees interviewed over the years have been 
reluctant to upset the South Korean government.6 Even those who barely lived in the 
north are likely to hesitate to speak openly about the communist government due to South 
Korea’s strongly anti-communist climate. With the Korean War is still technically 
ongoing, and due to its ideology-driven nature, it seems possible that the opinions and 
experiences of both North Korean defectors and South Koreans have been consciously 
sanitized. 
Although it is completely improbable that the South Korean camps are even 
remotely as severe as Soviet or North Korean re-education camps, their existence 
suggests a South Korean desire to censor and control the narratives coming from 
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defectors. American journalist Barbara Demick describes the camps as helpful facilities 
created to ease the defector’s transition, but even from her optimistic point of view, her 
statement that “North Koreans also must unlearn much of what they were taught before” 
is revealing.7 News articles reveal a similarly unnerving element behind facilities like 
Hanawon. Unlike Demick, popular news articles tend to avoid her more friendly 
description of Hanawon as “something of a cross between a trade school and a halfway 
house” and use harsher terms like “detention center.”8 One article that refers to the camps 
as government resettlement centers still uses the term “inmates” regarding the North 
Koreans sent there.9 After reading through paragraphs admiring the facility’s attempts to 
support former North Koreans, one article mentions that, “The education period is 
required for defectors after they undergo a three-month interrogation procedure held by 
South Korea's National Intelligence Service. The process is used to determine whether 
defectors are spies from Pyongyang.”10 While the South Korean government has dealt 
with North Korean spies since the peninsula’s division, excusing a reasonable amount of 
distrust regarding refugees, Hanawon’s use as an interrogation center suggests that the 
camp uses a much more ideology driven re-education method than many seem to assume. 
Despite these issues, the voices of the Koreans who left the North, either during 
the occupation or those who defected later in life, provide a crucial window into what 
occurred in Seoul during the summer of 1950. While the experiences of those who 
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supported and benefited from communist control may not be uncovered until North 
Korea changes its policies on censoring information or even until reunification occurs (if 
ever), these oral histories are the closest scholars can get to understanding what happened 
during the summer of 1950. As early as 1951, American academics were already 
publishing the experiences of Korean men and women who had faced the occupation, and 
despite the glaringly anti-communist angle of these early works, the interviews revealed a 
number of significant trends.11 These interviews reveal that the occupation of Seoul gave 
many Koreans hope while terrifying many others. Some aspects of the North Korean 
government appealed to some of Seoul’s citizens, such as justice against former 
collaborators and greedy landlords. Despite the growing number of Koreans willing to at 
least tolerate communism, the occupying government’s efforts to both control and win 
over the city while implementing communism caused disorder and turmoil for many 
others. By examining selected oral histories and documents that discuss the occupation, 
these experiences can be woven into the currently lacking Korean War narrative. 
 
The Reds Take a City 
As a compilation of interviews with Koreans who survived the occupation, The 
Reds Take a City, offers vital information regarding the underappreciated event. 
Published in 1951, as the Korean War shifted into a never-ending stalemate, The Reds 
Take a City stands as one of the only English language works that focuses primarily on 
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the occupation of Seoul. Employed by the United States Airforce during the war, 
sociology professor John W. Riley and renown communications specialist Wilbur 
Schramm, worked together to assess the occupation of Seoul.12  
While the major value of the book is its eleven interviews with occupation 
survivors, the authors also include their own commentary on the situation. Riley and 
Schramm’s war-era insight is obviously valuable to contemporary historians and the book 
also contains a lengthy foreword and an intriguing translator’s note. Every piece included 
in the book, from the translation notes to the conclusion, offers insight into Korean War-
era attitudes on the occupation. Clearly from their era, the included pieces display the 
prevalent anti-communist rhetoric that America and its allies frequently employed against 
the enemy during the Cold War. Historian Charles Armstrong has suggested that the 
authors’ work on the occupation of Seoul “offered an unprecedented opportunity for 
Americans to study the ‘psychology of communism” as men such as Schramm and Riley 
had access to those who had “lived through the ninety-day communist occupation.”13 As 
a relic of its time, the book admittedly has major historiographical flaws, but for this 
thesis, it is an indispensable source for uncovering the events that took place in Seoul 
during the occupation. 
The Reds Take a City stands as an impressive work detailing the effects of a 
capitalist city under communist occupation, and it continues to stand as a suitable source 
regarding the reactions of South Korea’s allies as much of the peninsula turned red. 
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Despite the work’s attempt to academically analyze the occupation, the interview pool 
included only those who were in conflict with the occupying government. While many of 
the reviews on the book focused on the alarming content the authors incorporated, 
praising Riley and Schramm for their fascinating warning of the dangers of communism, 
a smaller number of reviews point out the work’s anti-communist slant. These reviews 
blasted the book for drowning in McCarthyism, providing insight into the diversity of 
attitudes regarding Cold War rhetoric but also serving as a window into the complicated 
nature of analyzing oral histories compiled during the Korean War. Riley and Schramm’s 
anti-communist predisposition, likely compounded by their employment by the military, 
buries much of the occupation of Seoul’s history under stories of fear and suffering and 
anti-communist rhetoric.  
Although it was written in 1952, Wilbert B. Dubin’s review of The Reds Take a 
City explains the work surprisingly well to a post-Cold War audience, stating that “one 
should not expect to find in this book a detailed record of the Communists’ short-lived 
occupation of Seoul or an analysis of their plans for this intended “North-South” 
capital.”14 Steeped so deeply in anti-communist rhetoric, Riley and Schramm fail to 
analyze much of the actual implementation of the occupation, focusing instead on the 
perceived horrors of communism. Dubin’s review further explains that the work portrays 
“the plight of the intellectuals, bureaucrats and others whose status attracted the 
Communists’ attention” pointing out that Reds Take a City falsely implies that this was 
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the common experience for all classes within Seoul. Dubin’s review succinctly 
demonstrates why the oral histories from this work hardly represent the experience of the 
average citizen of Seoul, a noteworthy point when similarly utilizing oral histories to 
understand the occupation’s history. Although the review is critical of the book’s lack of 
class representation and the absence of a sophisticated analysis of the situation, Dubin’s 
review points out the work’s most useful attribute for post-Cold War scholars. Dubin 
notes that through their anti-communist focus, Riley and Schramm included a 
considerable amount of information regarding how the North Koreans conducted 
“psychological warfare” within occupied Seoul.15 Impressed by this, Dubin suggests 
studying the use of North Korean propaganda to deal with political turmoil elsewhere. 
 Setting the tone of the book, The Reds Take a City begins with the question, 
“what have we learned from the attempted Communist aggression in Korea?”16 Written 
by the authors’ colleague, Frederick W. Williams, the book’s foreword depicts the 
occupation of Seoul as a cautionary tale. Williams dramatically warns readers that “here, 
then, is the lesson in Communist intentions, intentions which are being consistently 
planned for execution in every home – in city and on farm – around the world. In your 
home, too!”17 Although the foreword makes it clear that The Reds Take a City is a work 
of anti-communist rhetoric, its unique focus on the occupation of Seoul provides a useful 
source of information on the event. Riley and Schramm aimed to assess North Korea’s 
actions in Seoul, and despite its political motivation, their initial ambition left the final 
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project rich with detail.18 Williams’ addition to the book explains Riley and Schramm’s 
methods while also disclosing the details behind the American government’s attempt to 
study the enemy. Further validating the work’s enduring value, Williams reveals the 
abundance of sources the two authors had access to, such as hundreds of oral histories, 
classified American and South Korean materials, the expertise of local Korean 
academics, and even precious documents left behind by the North Koreans.19 While The 
Reds Take a City includes dramatic passages that sound ridiculous to the ears of readers 
over half a century after the war, its importance as a genuine relic of the occupation and 
the Cold War, is undeniable. 
In the foreword, Williams advises that while the book sought to understand the 
occupation, the team created to assess it did not fully begin its work until Seoul had 
already been reclaimed by the South.20 By the time Riley and Schramm began 
documenting experiences, Inchon Landing had already occurred and the North Koreans 
had been successfully pushed north of the 38th parallel (at least until the Chinese 
eventually entered the conflict.) The fact that the situation had changed so dramatically 
before the interviews were conducted is worth noting. Had these interviews taken place 
during the occupation, it would have been easier to assess how Koreans felt about the 
possibility of the country being reunited under communism. By the time these interviews 
were conducted though, the UN had made its position clear by coming to South Korea’s 
aid, an action that must have drastically changed the atmosphere in Seoul. By 1951, 
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American and UN forces had made it clear that they would commit considerable military 
force to ensure Seoul to remain under ROK control.  
As an important source uncovering the occupation of Seoul, even the book’s 
translator’s note is surprisingly significant. Translator Hugh Heung-wu Cynn, who 
translated each story from Korean to English, expended his one-page note to mostly 
denounce the evils of the communists. Cynn’s note leaves the impression that the 
translator was either passionately anti-communist or that he felt compelled to portray 
himself as such while employed by Americans. Writing exactly a year after the 
occupation of Seoul, Cynn’s note invokes rhetoric hauntingly similar to the post-war 
propaganda later used by North Korea, stating that Korea had been divided by the 
exploitation of “an imperialistic neighbor.”21 While it may feel to a post-Cold War reader 
that Cynn was criticizing South Korea’s imperialistic allies, it becomes clear that the 
translator was attacking North Korea’s relationship with the USSR, as he further adds 
that “the weapons used by this neo-imperialist are ideological and military. The 
communists are destroying humanity wherever they go in the name of saving humanity.” 
22 Cynn’s rhetoric of imperialists ruining Korea is almost jarring to modern readers used 
to similar phrases used by, rather than against, communist regimes. In the note’s closing, 
The Reds Take a City warns readers once again, stating that “this is the foreshadow of 
what may come to other countries and peoples unless imperialistic Communism is driven 
out beyond the pale of human society.” Cynn is mentioned in Williams’ foreword as a 
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faithful translator “now studying and working in the United States” and considering his 
attitude throughout the note, there is an unconfirmed possibility that Cynn’s outspoken 
disgust with communism influenced his translations.23  
While The Reds Take a City was undeniably an anti-communist work, its analysis 
allows historians to move beyond the common binary of communism vs. anti-
communism. The oral histories used in this thesis, even those from propaganda-heavy 
works, demonstrate that the everyday lives of average citizens depended on a deeper 
meaning than whether or not they supported communism. While the ideological warfare 
influenced their lives greatly, their experience cannot be simply summed up by their 
political affiliation. 
 
Oral Histories from The Reds Take a City 
 With the opinions of those who worked on the book already providing 
considerable insight into the occupation, it is unsurprising that the oral histories included 
in the work offer rich, crucial information. The stories of those who experienced the 
occupation first-hand reveal the drama of such an incident, but also its more mundane 
aspects such as demonstrating how North Korean forces attempted to run the occupied 
city. The interview of Chin-Ho Yu, for example, begins with the note that the 
communists targeted him for his role in framing the Republic of Korea’s constitution.24 
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As the North Korean army took control of Seoul, their attempt to proceed with the 
communist ideology that they had embraced and promoted, meant openly ousting and 
punishing their political enemies. Where the ROK government disappointed and angered 
South Koreans by continuing to employ former collaborators, the communist government 
was compelled to strike against Koreans such as Yu in order to stake its legitimacy as 
Korea’s rightful government.  
 Yu’s interview begins with his recollection of the skirmishes between North and 
South Korea as he attempts to convey the intense shock felt by Seoul’s inhabitants as the 
North Korean army descended on the area. Even from a considerably privileged position 
in South Korean society, Yu only learned of the North Korean attack over the 38th 
parallel from Seoul’s newspapers.25 Like many others living in the area, Yu struggled to 
process the reality of the attack, even as the sounds of fighting reached the city. One of 
the most compelling recurring themes throughout many of the interviews is the sense of 
shock and disbelief that many felt.  
While Yu had access to internal information regarding the brewing civil war, he 
remained lost in shock until he could no longer deny that communist forces had in fact 
entered Seoul. Yu’s explanation of the occupation’s eve reveals that the ROK 
government had been ill-equipped to defend the capital, as even those with strong 
connections to the government were left depending on the radio and local news outlets. 
Yu further adds that local radio stations failed to prepare and guide South Koreans during 
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the turmoil, lamenting that “greatly troubled, I kept my seat by the radio, but except for 
Defense Minister Shin’s short address at about midnight, there was no news or 
commentary of any kind.”26 According to Yu, it was a colleague, rather than the radio, 
who informed Yu that the nearby town of Chunchon had been taken by the North 
Koreans.27  Faced with the fact that the communists were successfully taking nearby 
villages, Yu’s shock transformed into fear. 
Despite Yu’s access to information, the shock that Koreans like him felt 
demonstrates both how efficiently and swiftly the communists took Seoul but also how 
such an attack affected those directly in its path. Yu references the early skirmishes 
between the two Koreas, explaining that he “did not know whether the puppets had 
started a real war between north and south, or whether this war was nothing more than a 
large-scale quarrel over the 38th line.”28 The months of sporadic skirmishes over the 38th 
parallel had evidently numbed locals to the brewing conflict. 
Yu was convinced that the communists would never dare to risk the wrath of the 
United States by attacking the South.29 While North Korea and its allies were initially 
cautious, by the spring of 1950 both Stalin and Mao had given Kim Il Sung their 
endorsement to attempt to reunite the peninsula by force. Even Mao, who had been 
particularly wary of American intervention in Asia, assured Kim that, “as regards the 
Americans, there is no need to be afraid of them. The Americans will not enter a third 
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world war for such a small territory.”30 While South Korea’s relationship with the US had 
protected the country for a time, it had also blinded many to the determination of North 
Korea to reunify the country on its own terms.  
Yu also describes how local ROK soldiers regularly boasted during the months 
that led up to the occupation, claiming that their forces would soon control North Korea 
and reunite the country.31 While Yu states that he was well aware of the ROK Army’s 
ineptness thanks to his connections within the government, it is reasonable that the 
general confidence of South Korean soldiers encouraged a false sense of security among 
civilians. Yu also mentions that southern newspapers and radio announcers falsely 
proclaimed that American Air Force had swept into the region, preventing the North 
Korean Army from continuing towards the city.32 With so much misinformation 
circulating throughout the area, along with the general shock regarding the situation, it is 
unsurprising that many locals struggled with the reality that Seoul was under an 
impending attack by the North Koreans.  
Yu’s interview also discusses that the Seoul Police Bureau and other state 
agencies were simply abandoning the city as quickly as possible.33 Those who recognized 
their status as enemies of the North Korean state were acutely aware of the dangerousness 
of the situation, and Yu suggests that they dominated access to vehicles, leaving ordinary 
citizens behind as they fled the city. Even as a prominent professor with connections to 
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the government, Yu came close to being left behind until an acquaintance allowed him to 
cram into one of the last taxis leaving the city (with eight other men already stuffed into 
it.)34 
Yu’s status as a supporter of the ROK government and a member of the elite was 
transcended by the chaotic nature of the takeover, as policy makers left even men like 
him to scramble for survival. Yu’s personal experience and connections paint a chaotic 
picture of the first days of the city’s occupation. As he scrambled to leave the city, the 
professor chanced upon a group of panicked government officials. The men, Yu included, 
expressed that “it was maddening, after all we had talked so much about the puppets and 
the probability of attack, and had believed in our government and in our National 
Defense army, that in less than two days we had reached our present desperate 
situation.”35 The men’s observation demonstrates the enormous disappointment citizens 
felt as the city fell, especially for those who had helped to create and run the fairly new 
Republic of Korea. As the occupation began, interviews such as Yu’s explain how 
Seoul’s citizens dealt with the disappointment and utter shock, as their entire government 
bolted south. Yu ends his interview lamenting that “who could have known that Seoul 
would be left to the iron heels of the enemy for ninety days?”36 
 The Reds Take a City also contains an interview with another local professor. 
Kun-Ho Lee, who not only witnessed the beginning of the occupation, but remained in 
Seoul during the entire ninety days. Lee’s memories of the event echo Yu’s, as he 
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explains the chaos and shock among his family and friends through their common 
attitude of “let come what may; if not death, it will be life.”37 According to Lee, 
occupying forces promptly decorated the city with pro-communist flyers and posters. By 
remaining in the city, Lee witnessed first-hand how North Korean forces dealt with the 
opposition. Referring to the People’s Courts as the “liquidation of reactionaries,” he 
accuses the courts of being publicity stunts where participants felt pressured to support all 
allegations.38 Considering Lee’s pre-War position as a well-known anti-communist, it is 
unsurprising that he expected little justice from the courts. Despite his issues with the 
occupying forces though (along with his reputation and published works attacking 
communism) Lee remained safe within Seoul until several weeks before the occupation 
ended, when he decided to flee rather than join their army.39  
 Providing a helpful timeline of events, Lee explains that about three weeks into 
the occupation, the occupying government shifted its focus away from winning over the 
locals; surprised by the United Nation’s swift and severe response to their attack, Lee 
claims that the North Korean forces began to target problematic individuals.40 News-
reporter Chul-Hoe Koo’s experience suggests that as the occupation went on, North 
Korean forces became harsher and hastier. It was not until August 12th that communist 
forces arrested Koo, for his role as a former candidate for the South Korean national 
assembly.41 With ROK and American forces holding onto a chunk of South Korea known 
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as the Pusan Perimeter, communist forces were tightening their hold on Seoul, lashing 
out at potential capitalist-supporters such as Koo. 
Chin-Ho Yu’s interview portrays the communists as the enemy, but his stance on 
communism is left somewhat murky despite his role as a framer of the ROK constitution. 
Despite referring to the communists as puppets, Yu conveys a moderate stance on the 
situation rather than the shallow attitude of an anti-communist alarmist. Yu condemns 
both sides of the war, complaining that “the leftists are battling and pig-headed” while the 
right suffers from “feudal leaning and ideological poverty.”42 Contrastingly, Sin-Duk 
Whang, a teacher in Seoul, refers to the North Koreans with the less flattering nickname 
“the Red Satans.”43 Forcefully moved to Pyongyang by North Korean forces, Whang’s 
interview is far from sympathetic towards the communist government, as she accuses the 
communist government of manipulation and constant massacres.44 Although she had 
been under who she also refers to as the “cruel puppets” for a month before communist 
forces moved her north, her interview focuses exclusively on her own torment under the 
occupation. Whang’s interview demonstrates that her personal trauma at the hands of 
communist forces shaped much of her personal perception of the occupation.  
Kun-Ho Lee makes his anti-communist stance clear, as he suggests that their 
seizure of personal property was possibly an attempt to gather “special presents to 
Stalin.”45 He further explains that “these Communists are the real exploiters and enemies 
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of the people” adding that the character of Bolshevism includes animalism, sadism, and 
deception and that “communism is not one of those political ideas which can be appraised 
on the same level with countless others. It is an eternal enemy of the human race.”46 
Lee’s disgust with communism, notably less than a year after the occupation, is clear as 
he ends his interview with a warning, “look straight at the revealed evil of the Reds. 
There can be no compromise, no concession. Here is the clear need for battle. We may 
have to sacrifice everything, but only by winning this battle can we keep alive the hope 
for man.”47 
The interviews in The Reds Take a City are undoubtedly the richest source of 
information on the occupation, as they go into depth discussing how South Korean 
citizens survived such an ordeal. Nevertheless, every interview used in the book 
supported the ROK and opposed the occupation. Although they provide little more than 
the pro-South Korean understanding of the conflict, these stories fill many of the gaps in 
the occupation’s narrative. 
 
Korean-American Interviews 
 The Korean American Historical Society’s Oral History Project is a collection of 
interviews of first generation Korean-Americans living in the Pacific Northwest. Most of 
the interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2011 with elderly Korean-Americans 
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who experienced many of Korea’s twentieth-century events before re-locating to 
Washington State. While some of those interviewed were more focused on events in the 
US, or simply too young to have experienced the Korean War, several men and women 
were raised in Seoul during the US and North Korean occupations. With the eldest person 
interviewed still in his teens during the occupation, this set of interviews differs subtly 
from those in The Reds Take a City. While The Reds Take a City featured government 
officials, professors, and reporters, the Korean American Historical Society’s interviews 
represent the young adults and children of the occupation.  
While Robert Hyungchan Kim’s memories of the war reiterate many of the 
experiences detailed in The Reds Take a City, his situation is somewhat unique as his 
family faced the occupation as former citizens of North Korea. Kim’s parents had been 
former landlords who had also openly collaborated with the Japanese. By the late 1940s, 
the terror that landlords in China had faced was well-known and families such as Kim’s 
fled North Korea as it transitioned into a communist state.48 Relocating to Seoul in 1948, 
his family settled in the area until the occupation forced them to flee once again. While 
discussing his family’s plight, Kim briefly mentions that Seoul was the main destination 
for most of the Korean refugees fleeing communism. Kim explains that while his family 
remained in North Korea for a few years, his “brother came down to Seoul about a year 
and a half earlier than us, because my brother was branded as [a] Japanese collaborator 
immediately after Korea’s liberation because everybody in town. . . knew that he worked 
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with [the] Japanese military.”49 Kim further elaborates that Koreans living in Manchuria 
were also resettling in Seoul rather than the nearer Pyongyang. While the Chinese 
reclaimed Manchuria, after Japanese forces were defeated in WWII, the Chinese 
Communist Party quickly gained control of the area. Since many local Koreans had 
collaborated with the occupying Japanese, local Koreans feared the CCP.50 With North 
Korea also “going red,” Seoul became the closest capitalist destination for refugees 
fleeing communism.  
Many Korean refugees were relocating to Seoul prior to the occupation, and 
accounts of the period such as Kim’s demonstrate that refugees were sharing their fears 
and anxieties of communism with Seoul’s growing populace as terrifying rumors of 
brutality preceded the North Korean army. Refugee families such as Kim’s, who had fled 
the North, were convinced that they would be put to death if the Northern government 
encountered the family. Kim’s story reveals that even Koreans who had fled the North 
well before the war had begun feared retribution for immigrating. As a testament to how 
profoundly terrified many Koreans were of such retribution, Kim explains how his own 
family spent the first few days of the occupation hiding inside their home’s crawl-space.  
With so many refugees fleeing the communists in both Manchuria and North 
Korea, Seoul’s citizens were well-informed of the potential danger marching towards the 
city. While many, such as Kim’s family, feared and mistrusted the communist 
government, others in Seoul welcomed the army. As Kim details the first few days of the 
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occupation, he recounts that his family had sent him out of the crawl space and into Seoul 
to investigate the situation, trusting that his young age would keep him safe from 
suspicion.51 Only four days after the Korean War had begun, Kim found Seoul filled with 
North Korean tanks and troops, but more interestingly, he witnessed “a lot of girls – high 
school girls, college girls… shouting to welcome North Korean soldiers into the city”52 
Kim’s amazement regarding the number of girls celebrating the North’s victory is 
fascinating, as it suggests that this was out of the ordinary. Kim’s observation verifies to 
some degree, the claim made my revisionist historians that some women in Seoul were 
impressed and interested in North Korea’s policies regarding gender equality.53 
Kim’s memories also provide evidence of how prevailing gender norms 
influenced the lives of women during the occupation. Kim and the male members of his 
family prepared to secretly escape from Seoul as the communists gained control of the 
city, while leaving behind wives and sisters who could then protect family property.54 In 
order to protect the family home, women faced the prospect of being permanently 
separated from their families.  
While Robert Hyungchan Kim’s family was able to survive the occupation by 
leaving the city, others were unable to escape undetected. Namkung Johsel’s experience 
illustrates the tragic fate that prominent citizens of Seoul faced under the occupying 
government. Namkung had grown up in Pyongyang and his father had been a professor 
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with an American PhD in theology.55 Despite his father’s efforts to relocate the family to 
Seoul at the end of WWII, Namkung’s father was unable to escape North Korean 
forces.56 While he had initially been safe in the capital, when the occupation began, the 
North Korean government sought him out almost immediately. Namkung recalls that at 
first the North Koreans diplomatically approached his family, asking the distinguished 
professor to voluntarily relocate to Pyongyang to be used for propaganda targeted 
towards Christians. The communists wanted Namkung’s father to help entice Christians 
to embrace the new government and ideology by broadcasting that “Koreans in North 
Korea [are] allowed to worship.”57 Namkung’s mother convinced the communist officials 
to wait several days and allow her husband to prepare for his voluntary return to 
Pyongyang. While her actions had actually been an attempt to stall the communists from 
taking her husband, the officials returned before the professor could successfully escape 
south. Found hidden in the family’s wood pile, the North Korean agents captured 
Namkung’s father, forcefully taking him to Pyongyang. The fate of his father is unknown 
as Namkung claims that his family never heard from him again. The Korean War’s 
sudden outbreak altered Seoul from the safe-haven it had been for those fleeing the 
communists. Families such as Namkung’s and Kim’s were suddenly forced to flee again 
or face the wrath of a government that now regarded their families as enemies of the 
people. 
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William Se Heung Kang’s experience differs from Namkung and Kim’s as he 
grew up in Seoul and experienced the occupation as a local. Only ten years old in 1950, 
Kang’s interview also presents the narrative of the occupation through the eyes of a child. 
His recollection demonstrates a shock and detachment similar to what older Koreans 
explained throughout other interviews. Kang’s memories detail how children living in 
Seoul reacted to the events as he explains that “even the bomb explosion in the Korean 
War, we were not terrified with that – we watched it with excitement (we did not know 
what it was). Yet I cried when [my] elementary school was bombed and burned.”58 While 
seemingly naïve, Kang’s childlike failure to understand the situation is almost identical to 
the shocked reactions of many adults such as Yu from The Reds Take a City. 
Kang’s family remained in Seoul throughout the entire occupation, unlike many 
of the others interviewed. His family had been unable to move south until well after the 
initial occupation, finally leaving the area as Chinese troops secretly poured into the 
peninsula to help North Korea retake Seoul.59 When Kang explains that his family 
remained in Seoul until December of 1950, the interviewer immediately asks, “So you 
could not escape from Seoul earlier than [the] 1.4 retreat. That means that you stayed in 
Seoul until then. Didn’t you have any difficulties in Seoul?”60 The fact that the 
interviewer locks onto this particular detail of Kang’s recollection is noteworthy.  On the 
surface, the question is logical, considering that Kang’s extended family had been former 
landlords living in North Korea. Kang assures the interviewer that while his family was 
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in some danger due to their North Korean accent, they simply “had to be very cautious” 
to avoid any issues with the communists.61  
Another refugee, Jean Kim, provides strikingly vivid details of the war and the 
occupation as she describes the ordeal that her family experienced as communist forces 
entered the city.62 A refugee living in Seoul during the war, her family had fled North 
Korea (also escaping her abusive father) in the late 1940s. Revealing why families like 
Jean Kim’s remained in Seoul throughout the occupation, she bitterly brings up the South 
Korean government’s disastrous strategy of blowing up the Han River Bridge. Panicking 
as the North Korean army moved closer, Syngman Rhee’s men detonated explosives 
across Seoul’s main bridge as they fled south, stranding many civilians in the city.63 The 
destruction of the bridge devastated those left behind in Seoul as it trapped families like 
Jean Kim’s. Her narrative vividly illustrates the experiences of those unable to escape 
after the bridge collapsed, explaining that “the South Korean government blew the Han 
river bridge to prevent the enemy's chase but it kept most of [the] citizens in the hands of 
the enemies who showed up in Seoul within 3 days of the war [and] occupied, controlled 
and killed many citizens for three months.”64 For Kim, her experience with the 
occupation had been colored vividly by the trauma she experienced as the communists 
captured the city as well as her disappointment with the ROK government’s actions.  
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Ikhwan Choe’s interview is significantly different from the others, as he not only 
lived in North Korea during the beginning of the war, but he also fought as a soldier on 
both sides.65 Although Choe experienced the war far from Seoul, he saw firsthand how 
the communists implemented their ideology and he also witnessed North Korean attitudes 
regarding the occupation of Seoul from a significant position as a fellow North Korea. 
While much of his interview strays away from Seoul, his knowledge of the military and 
communist conduct provides clues regarding the occupation. 
Choe’s insight into the two opposing armies is surprising, as he reveals that 
despite his disillusionment with communism, they tended to treat their soldiers 
considerably better than their enemies had. Although he outright fled the People’s Army 
after being pressured to join, he favorably contrasts them against the South Korean Army. 
He reveals that his time serving in the Republic of Korea’s army was dreadful. Choe 
discloses that the ROK leaders verbally abused lower ranked soldiers while, 
contrastingly, in the North Korean army, “even the officers did not use low forms of 
speech to soldiers. They called the soldiers “comrade” and never used the slangs… 
usually their hierarchy was weaker than what existed between seniors and juniors in 
Japanese middle school.”66 Choe further laments that the ROK army “always used 
abusive languages and beat soldiers.”67 Choe’s recollections verify what historians have 
claimed about the two opposing armies. According to Cumings, “ROKA officers 
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exploited their own men, and beat them mercilessly for infractions” prompting large 
numbers of desertions.68  
While soldiers of the Republic of Korea frequently faced misery and injustice, the 
northern government promoted and enforced a sense of equality that resonated with many 
lower-class Koreans. Choe makes it clear that he experienced first-hand North Korea’s 
social policies, but there are few hints in any of the oral histories regarding how 
communist economic policies were implemented in occupied Seoul. Land reform policies 
had done especially well in North Korea (surprisingly without provoking much violence) 
while the government promoted the policies as Kim Il Sung’s gifts to the peasants.69 The 
North Korean government had already experienced how Korean citizens in the north 
would react to the implementation of such major social and economic changes, so it is 
unsurprising that similar policies were swiftly initiated within occupied Seoul.   
As a former North Korean, Choe’s experiences provided him with a unique 
vantage point into the communist government’s methods. The authors of The Reds Take a 
City, asserted that there was a visible pattern in communist methods for capturing and 
governing regions, warning that:  
From the very moment of entry, the actions of the invaders followed a carefully 
detailed blueprint for a Communist state of Korea, to which Seoul was to be the 
key. It followed the pattern worked out during the five Communist years in North 
Korea, a pattern which, in turn, found its model in Moscow and the European 
satellites… In the operation of the plan during Seoul’s ninety days of Red 
occupation, we have the blueprint of the birth and development of a Sovietized 
state. It provides one of the best glimpses behind the iron curtain that we have 
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been permitted, and its understanding is, of first importance to all peoples who 
still enjoy a free world.70 
 
Although their words are dramatic, there is merit within their comparison to North 
Korea’s initial years and the occupation of Seoul. Riley and Schramm’s assertion that the 
occupation served as a model of communist policies, is evident through the experiences 
of those who witnessed the occupation, as they share striking similarities with what many 
North Korean refugees also witnessed. The North Korean government visibly stuck to a 
formula with how it enacted communist policies across Korea. Understanding the 
existence of such patterns of operation, interviews like Choe’s serve as valuable evidence 
for the interpretation of the occupation. 
 Yunsung Lee’s interview also comes from the perspective of life in the North, but 
his experiences shed light more on how the new government implemented communist 
policies and social change at the local level. Lee offers some context to the occupation, 
by describing how North Koreans experienced a change in the social atmosphere several 
months after the area’s liberation from Japan. Explaining the change, Lee states that 
“when high school social science teachers lecture, when they explicate Marx and 
Communism, it was like a revival meeting at a church.” For Lee, right-leaning students 
like himself felt increasingly uneasy with the ideological fervor that swept North Korea. 
Lee’s experience, although somewhat removed from the occupation, offers some clues 
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towards unpacking how many of Seoul’s citizens likely felt as the city fell under 
communist control.  
Lee also provides a vivid recollection of the communist assault on South Korea 
and the takeover of Seoul from the North Korean point of view.71  
On June 25th morning, around eleven o’clock, I turned on the radio. The 
announcer, with an upset voice, said that they will broadcast critical news. Until 
then, not once an anchor broadcasted with such a tense voice. Thinking that 
something might have happened at the 38 parallel, I waited until twelve. At 
twelve o’clock sharp, when the bell rang, (it is still unforgettable) it said “at 2 
o’clock this morning, in the gray of the daybreak, South Korean (Nam Choson) 
puppet military forces launched an invasion of North Korea in front of the 38 
parallel. Then it said our brave people’s army promptly resisted and is fighting 
back, and now we are the ones who are counterattacking them down to the South. 
Since the North was good at lying, I interpreted on my own; you guys started the 
war and are being chased now. Only the half of my interpretation was right. It was 
right that the North started, but my belief on the South coming into the North was 
a big misunderstanding. I overestimated the South.  I was deceived by South 
Korean politicians’ bragging about their situation, listening to the South Korean 
broadcastings and the US military’s Far East Broadcast Company.  They, people 
like Yi Pom-Sok, said that once the fight between the North and the South begins, 
when the war begins, our brave Korean military will move north quickly, have 
lunch in Pyongyang, eat dinner in Sinŭiju, and liberate North Korea. They said it 
will be a speedy war.  I did not believe in everything, but I think I did 
overestimate South Korea.72 
 
 Gripped by the shocking news that the ROK had failed to defeat communist 
troops, Lee listened carefully to the radio as North Korea continued its assault on the 
south. Struggling to believe that the People’s Army was actually defeating ROK troops 
he was forced to face reality when his cherished Seoul radio station began to broadcast 
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communist propaganda.73 Devastated, and now isolated from outside news, Lee groaned, 
“how should I live if the Reds unify the country?”74 The swift success of the People’s 
Army and the loss of Seoul seemed to communicate to many that Korea was about to be 
reunified under communism.  
 
The Summer of Terror  
Through these interviewees, the communist takeover of Seoul was an important 
period of the war. On the larger scale, communist control over Seoul gave the North 
Koreans temporary legitimacy while also giving hope to those who opposed a capitalistic 
government. For Seoul’s citizens, the occupation meant new levels of chaos and 
confusion as both sides of the war transformed Seoul into a battleground.   
To narrate how the occupation ended, the final chapter discusses the events that 
occurred both inside Seoul and beyond the city’s borders as North Korean control waned. 
As the Americans and South Koreans prepared for Inchon Landing, the military feat that 
would successfully expel the communists from Seoul, those living within the city faced a 
new, terrifying period of the Korean War. With South Korea and its allies especially 
nervous after North Korea’s June assault and North Korean troops desperate to hold onto 
the captured region, civilians suffered enormously. American and South Korean forces 
lashed out harshly towards potential communists as they began to retake the region, 
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leading to the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians.75 The beginning of the 
occupation may have been more memorable to those living in Seoul, but the existing 
silence regarding the event’s conclusion must also be examined to fully understand the 
entirety of the occupation.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE BATTLE FOR KOREA’S SEOUL 
 While this thesis primarily concentrates on Seoul, this chapter expands its focus to 
the greater communist occupation of South Korea. While personal narratives convey the 
sense of panic and fear that erupted as communist forces captured Seoul, the events that 
occurred that summer elsewhere on the peninsula provide extra insight into the 
occupation’s final weeks. Using this insight, this chapter strives to fill in the gaps in the 
occupation’s narrative by detailing the events that led to Seoul’s recapture, as well as the 
aftermath as American and ROK forces drove the communist government north.  
Mere weeks after the June 25, 1950 outbreak of war, the DPRK had successfully 
taken over almost all of the Korean peninsula, reducing the anti-communist state of the 
Republic of Korea to a tiny region on the peninsula’s south-eastern coast. The possibility 
of a Korea united under communism seemed certain as North Korean forces swiftly 
removed the ROK government from most of Korea. Despite their initial success, the 
communist government’s chance to conduct reunification vanished as DPRK-controlled 
Seoul fell to American and ROK troops in late September of 1950.  
One month into the occupation, the American government began to deploy troops 
into Korea, attempting to save the ROK by adding their forces to the defense of the area 
remaining under South Korean control. While this allowed American forces to eventually 
retake Seoul and return the southern half of the peninsula to the ROK, Syngman Rhee 
and General MacArthur began to more openly covet the chance to completely wipe out 
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North Korea.1 MacArthur’s zeal for annihilating the communist government combined 
with Syngman Rhee’s thirst for control over a unified Korea and transformed the initial 
plan to simply retake the south into a total assault on the existence of the DPRK.2 
Meanwhile, in Seoul, the People’s Committees from the late 1940s, that had been 
dismantled by the ROK, had been able to reestablish under the communist government.3 
Rather than being ruled by North Korean party members though, these Seoul-based 
committees were largely run by South Koreans.4 Now that the ROK government had fled, 
Seoul’s once vibrant leftist groups could once again flourish in the former capital. On top 
of empowering the people’s committees, the occupying forces also helped feed the 
growing numbers of poor living in the area, many of them refugees, by working to 
redistribute the region’s rice supply.5 Documents reveal that communist forces were also 
able to smoothly enact land reform in South Korea (with surprisingly little violence) by 
placing many of the decisions regarding the land redistribution into the hands of local 
land owners and tenants.6 While for many in Seoul, the occupation had been an especially 
terrifying period of the war, for others who were able to benefit from the situation, the 
occupation had been a liberation.7 
 For a considerable number of Koreans, life in Seoul during the summer of 1950 
was absolute hell. While the North Korean People’s Army redistributed land, wealth, and 
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food, they left the “administration of justice in the hands of local peace preservation 
groups” which usually included people who had been political prisoners under the ROK 
government.8 Incensed ex-prisoners were allowed to release their rage onto the men and 
women who had supported the very regime that had imprisoned them. Kun-Ho Lee 
pointedly refers to the peace preservation groups and the people’s courts as the 
“liquidation of reactionaries.”9 Many of the stories in The Reds Take a City, such as 
Lee’s, reveal how the brutality of the peace preservation groups affected local opinions 
regarding the occupying forces. Lee’s grandmother recounted that without warning, 
government cadres would gather neighborhood residents to take part in people’s courts 
where they felt pressured to harshly judge accused rightists, unable to safely object to 
their executions.10 While the people’s committees had been enacted to empower citizens, 
in reality, they had mostly just increased tensions between Seoul’s citizens and the 
occupying government. 
The occupying government quickly recognized the growing issues with the 
citizen-led groups. North Korea actively sought to discourage Seoul’s citizens from 
abusing the peace preservation system, as the government ordered soldiers to “strictly 
prohibit arrests and killings without cause” while also forbidding the rampant looting of 
religious and right-leaning buildings and homes.11 While the communist government 
attempted to maintain what it referred to as “revolutionary order,” citizens inspired by 
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both ideology and opportunity unleashed new levels of chaos in Seoul.12 Despite the 
communists’ attempts to reduce the chaos, oral histories reveal that the violence 
continued to influence how many in Seoul regarded the government. To locals such as 
Kun-Ho Lee and his grandmother, it was the North Korean government that fostered and 
allowed Seoul to suffer at the hands of the rampant kangaroo courts. 
 The few documents left behind by the occupiers, confirm that Koreans with ties to 
anything right-leaning had good reasons to be apprehensive towards the communist 
government. Families such as Robert Kim’s, had suspected that the communists would 
seek to punish Koreans who had fled North Korea, and one document from July 16, 1950 
confirms this, as it directed authorities to “punish spies who are from the North first.”13 
While Cumings argues that the document suggests that accused spies were merely 
interrogated and punished with property confiscation, it does verify that the government 
actively targeted expatriates.14 
Offering clues concerning how and why the North Korean occupiers labeled some 
citizens as “rightists,” one document reveals that the government had outlined factors that 
could bar a Korean from voting in upcoming elections: anyone who had worked with any 
government, organization, or political group that was in any way opposed to communism 
could be labeled a rightist.15 Also, anyone who had supported the American occupation 
through economic means as well as any Koreans who had been accused of collaboration 
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with the Japanese, and as seen through the oral histories, large numbers of Koreans fell 
into these categories.16 While the occupation of Seoul may have been surprisingly 
liberating for many, the communist party had identified the state’s enemy well before it 
took complete control of the city. With so many North Korean refugees in Seoul who 
understood the ease with which the communists could blacklist citizens, it is unsurprising 
that many were fearful of the occupation and chose to flee rather than remain under 
communist control.  
 For much of the occupation, many of the grievances expressed by locals, 
concerned the war rather than the communist government. North Korean reports reveal 
that peasants were grateful for the communist land reforms. 17 The major complaints 
Seoul’s citizens made mostly related to the war-time conditions such as the lack of food 
and suffering inflicted by the frequent air-raids.18 The biggest complaint many South 
Koreans had towards the communists was the government’s regular expectation of corvée 
labor from the peasants without any benefits.19 Considering that the Americans held one 
of the best Air Forces in the world, following WWII, it is unsurprising that US retaliation 
came in the form of air-raids. American bombs devastated villages and led to an 
extremely large number of civilian deaths during the occupation.20 The occupying 
government may have introduced positive social programs that benefited some, but 
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American bombings combined with other aspects of the war (such as food shortages) to 
torment citizens. 
Although the occupation itself had been conducted relatively smoothly, its final 
weeks were gripped by violence and chaos as American and ROK troops converged on 
the city. Communist forces became increasingly anxious as American and ROK forces 
moved towards Seoul and in response, the North Korean government began to hastily 
execute accused rightists.21 The American victory at Inchon Landing had produced a 
sense of panic and urgency within the occupied city and North Korean forces began to 
behave differently towards Seoul’s citizens.22 A housewife in Seoul explained that, “at 
first, they were somewhat friendly to people, and it was only as the tide of the war turned 
against them, especially after the United Nations forces landed at Inchon, that they turned 
into devils doing every savagery.”23 Up until Inchon Landing, Seoul had been somewhat 
removed from the war’s violence as most of the combat was concentrated in the far south. 
With the North Korean hold on most of the Korean peninsula reversed in mere days, the 
relationship between the communist occupiers and Seoul’s citizens promptly deteriorated.  
Many of the interviews in The Reds Take a City demonstrate how attitude of the 
invading government began to change as the communist lost patience with Seoul’s 
remaining right-wing supporters. By mid-August, a month before communist Seoul 
would fall back into ROK hands, the occupying government began to crack down on 
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those they viewed as anti-communist “reactionaries.”24 Cumings assures readers that 
“every soldier and official behaved like a political officer, using extensive face-to-face 
communications…” and that “when people were arrested it was done apologetically and 
always in terms of the necessity of locating some ‘outside enemy.”25 While this may have 
been the case in the beginning, a number of the interviews, especially those from accused 
reactionaries, recall smug, dismissive, and sometimes outright aggressive attitudes from 
arresting authorities. In many of the stories, especially those included in The Reds Take a 
City, the soldiers lie to the accused to covertly lure them into prison. While Cumings’ 
suggestion of a well-behaved occupying army falls short of the truth, the interviews 
highlight the effect that the instability of communist control over South Korea had on the 
city’s peace. The closer American forces came to Seoul the worse life became for 
ordinary Koreans. 
By mid-September, communist forces responded to the successful American 
invasion known as Inchon Landing by brazenly executing large numbers of accused 
rightists as well as American and South Korean prisoners of war.26 While North Korean 
leadership repeatedly warned against executing POWs, Inchon Landing visibly unnerved 
communist forces. Before the retreat north, communist soldiers became increasingly 
worried about dealing with imprisoned political enemies and captured troops. The closer 
American and ROK forces came to Seoul, the more often communist soldiers chose to 
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execute both political and military prisoners. Days before American and ROK troops 
could even reach the city, occupied Seoul was beginning to fall apart. 
 
Retaking South Korea: Cleansing Korea of Communism 
The atrocities committed by Korean communists as they returned north and 
abandoned Seoul haunted the DPRK throughout the war. As the talks for a cease-fire 
began, the American government and South Korea attacked the communists’ efforts in 
Seoul, using the mass executions and the rampant rumors of anti-rightist terror to 
condemn the DPRK.27 While the ROK and the US highlighted these atrocities as leverage 
for reparations and retribution, in recent decades it has become apparent that during the 
occupation, large numbers of Korean civilians were massacred at the hands of American 
and South Korean troops. Although many of the more horrific massacres occurred 
hundreds of miles from Seoul, they are relevant to the occupation, as Seoul eventually 
would eventually face similar atrocities as troops moved towards the city.  
While communist forces were settling into Seoul, the US began sending troops 
back into Korea, attempting to defend the final slice of the peninsula left under South 
Korean control. Fleeing the communist assault on the south, ROK troops could only hold 
onto a fifty-mile-wide region that included the coastal city of Pusan.28 Figure 1 illustrates 
the Pusan Perimeter, within the blue line on Korea’s south-east coast. Fortunately for 
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ROK forces, the last bit of land under their control was adjacent to American-occupied-
Japan, and US troops could fly directly into Pusan, thwarting North Korea’s eager efforts 
to completely take the peninsula.29 The months defending Pusan wore on American and 
ROK soldiers though, as North Korean troops spent much of the summer attempting to 
break through the Pusan Perimeter’s defenses.  
Apparent in figure 2, the ROK army began conducting mass executions of 
political prisoners during the summer of 1950 as they fled to Pusan.30 This photo, taken 
by a US army major one month into the occupation, demonstrates the actions taken 
against those accused of supporting communism.31 Considering that both the ROK army 
and the Americans had been attempting to wipe out the remaining pockets of communists 
during the march towards occupied Seoul, the accusation that innocent civilians were 
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frequently included in the executions is likely. As the American and South Korean 
militaries began to retake the south, their attempts to thwart communist guerrillas caused 
soldiers to regard Korean civilians suspiciously. By the time the ROK would retake 
Seoul, the US military had already decided to use force against suspected communists, 
regardless of their status as civilians. 
 
On July 26th, Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk received an important memo 
from the US Ambassador to South Korea, John Muccio.32 Classified until 1991, the 
memo reveals the military’s exaggeration of the dangers caused by Korean refugees in 
the south, while also demonstrating how nervous the US military had become during the 
occupation. The memo informed Rusk that American forces in Korea were adopting a 
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risky approach regarding refugees due to their suspicion that communist forces had been 
manipulating the presence of refugees to thwart and attack American troops.33 The memo 
further explained that the military planned to drop leaflets over refugees to warn them 
that if they moved from enemy territory towards ROK lines or traveled at night, they 
would be shot.34 The memo (which has become controversial since declassification) 
demonstrates the troubling attitude the American military adopted regarding Korean 
civilians, an approach that would eventually influence the fight for Seoul. 
In an ironic twist, while the memo blamed refugees for obstructing roadways and 
wandering too close to defense lines, they had only been in those problematic areas 
because US soldiers had pressured local Koreans to evacuate from their homes.35 
Historian Charles J. Hanley scornfully referred to the memo as a “clear statement of a 
theater-wide U.S. policy in July 1950 to open fire on approaching refugees” a decision 
that would lead to the massacres of innocent civilians. As American soldiers prepared to 
“cleanse” South Korea from communism, troops were ordered to open fire on suspicious 
refugees.36 With the occupation of Seoul in full bloom, the regions closer to Pusan began 
to undergo a brutal ideological cleansing as soldiers fought to return it to the Republic of 
Korea.  
As more official Korean War documents became declassified, the public became 
conscious of the atrocities committed by American soldiers during the war. One of the 
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most infamous incidents, known as the No Gun Ri massacre, remained relatively 
unknown until the late 1990s.37 Despite its late discovery, No Gun Ri has been 
considered by some as the precursor to the infamous My Lai Massacre in Vietnam, 
suggesting that No Gun Ri’s censorship paved the way for such brutality to continue in 
later conflicts. By late July, the refugee crises in southern Korea had rapidly deteriorated 
as civilians fled the occupied regions. Although the US government continues to deny 
responsibility for the conflicting information that sent civilians into peril, individual 
soldiers have confirmed their role in evacuating South Koreans from their homes.38  
With Seoul’s continued occupation, and the tension near the Pusan perimeter 
growing as North Koreans tried to eliminate the ROK’s last stand, mistrust overcame 
their sympathy for refugees. Near the village of No Gun Ri, American soldiers ordered an 
airstrike on a large group of recently evacuated civilians, even after concluding they were 
unarmed refugees.39 With about one hundred killed in the airstrike, the remaining 
refugees were forced to hide under a railroad tunnel-bridge while “U.S. soldiers then 
fired into both ends of the tunnels over a period of four days… resulting in approximately 
300 additional deaths.”40 Rather than vanquishing the supposed communist guerillas that 
had been hiding among refugees, female survivors maintain that American forces had 
instead murdered a group of huddled women and children.41 
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The existence of incidents such as No Gun Ri and other massacres reveal how 
chaotic the situation had become during the occupation, as American soldiers reacted 
appallingly towards Korean civilians, justifying their acts through their shared fear of 
communists hiding among the refugees. Rather than inspire the American public to 
harshly criticize the war, as the My Lai Massacre would a decade later, the incident 
stayed relatively hidden from public scrutiny.  The revelation that such brutality had 
happened in Korea, brought a new element to the legacy of the My Lai Massacre, as 
many began to wonder if public knowledge of No Gun Ri could have prevented the later 
incident. Hugh C. Thompson, the American soldier famous for his attempt to save 
Vietnamese civilians during the My Lai Massacre, was particularly vocal about No Gun 
Ri’s historical impact. Thompson condemned the censorship, suggesting that if the US 
government had been honest about No Gun Ri and dealt with its consequences “there 
would probably have been no My Lai.”42 On the same note, the final days of the 
occupation of Seoul may also have been less traumatic if the international community 
had been aware of the recent massacres in southern Korea.  
While the US government continues to insist that the killings at No Gun Ri 
occurred due to the unfortunate circumstances of the “fog of war” situation, supporters of 
the victims continue to dig up evidence that proves otherwise.43 Owing to a determination 
to uncover American atrocities in Korea, there has been a resurgence in interest of this 
early point in the Korean War, which has provided more information regarding how 
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American and ROK soldiers retook the peninsula and ended the occupation. The articles 
and newly unclassified documents detailing the summer of 1950 also give some insight 
into the North Korean side of the conflict. Inquiries into No Gun Ri reveal that after 
American soldiers fled the area, it was North Korean soldiers who came to the aid of the 
massacre’s survivors.44  While The Reds Take a City portrayed the communists as the 
antagonists of the occupation’s narrative, it is interesting to see a scenario where 
communist forces had to rescue South Korean civilians from their supposed saviors. 
While the No Gun Ri Massacre remained unexposed for decades, one month after 
the massacre at No Gun Ri, an American soldier named John Osborne published an 
article in LIFE magazine that discussed the on-going situation near the occupied zones.45 
Osborne explained in the article that America could not win a war against the communist 
if it only attacked through military means. His article moves past the typical critiquing of 
the overall war effort in Korea by disclosing that the army’s current tactics have 
repeatedly led to the blatant slaughter of Korean civilians. Osborne states the military’s 
unsympathetic and frequently cruel tactics instead led to massacres, “the blotting out of 
villages where the enemy may be hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may 
include North Koreans in the anonymous white clothing of the Korean countryside.”46 
Osborne’s article also unveils the atrocities he witnessed from South Korean troops: 
“They murder to save themselves the trouble of escorting prisoners to the rear; they 
murder civilians simply to get them out of the way or to avoid the trouble of searching 
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and cross-examining them.” Weeks away from Inchon Landing, Osborne’s confession 
came at a time when American soldiers had been suffering two months of constant 
assault from South Korean communist guerillas and North Korean soldiers. With the end 
of the occupation drawing nearer, the US military continued to use the same methods 
against the communists as they pushed into Seoul. 
Atrocities were committed by forces on both sides of the conflict, but the violence 
caused by communist troops has been heavily stressed in American literature since the 
outbreak of the war (as seen in works such as The Reds Take a City.) The US 
government’s work to conceal incidents like No Gun Ri from both the public and the 
ROK, has also affected information on the final weeks of the occupation.47 Although the 
No Gun Ri Massacre occurred far south of the occupied capital, it marks an important 
period in the war that affected communist Seoul’s final weeks. By August, the new anti-
refugee stance of American soldiers had shocked both the enemy as well as the 
international community. Even American newspapers reported on the callous attitudes of 
US troops, with one New Jersey paper warning, “It is not the time to be a Korean, for the 
Yankees are shooting them all . . . nervous American troops are ready to fire at any 
Korean.”48 With the knowledge that US soldiers were so callous towards Koreans, it is 
less surprising that the final weeks of the occupation were filled with an unprecedented 
amount of violence.  
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Landing in Inchon and Retaking Seoul 
 The one part of the occupation that has received considerable attention from 
scholars, has been its conclusion. Part of this due to the excellent documentation of the 
military feats that overcome the communists. While the feats at Inchon have captivated 
historians, who have already exhausted the subject thoroughly, the military feat is 
significant to the narrative of the occupation, as it explains how the communists lost 
Seoul and what occurred during the final days of communist Seoul. Figure 3 
demonstrates the beginning of the end for the occupation as American tanks crashed 
through communist barricades and entered the city. 
 
Seoul had been under communist control for three months by the time American 
forces could successfully move past merely protecting the Pusan Perimeter. After months 
Fig. 3. Associated Press. American Tank in Seoul. Oct. 7th, 1950. Digital image.  
Boston Globe, Boston. 
http://archive.boston.com/bigpicture/2010/06/remembering_the_korean_war_60.html 
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of struggling to maintain the perimeter, on September 15th, General Douglas MacArthur 
led the military feat that would restore the ROK’s control over the southern half of the 
peninsula.49 Inchon, a port only twenty-five miles from Seoul, offered American troops 
the chance to surprise the enemy with a massive military assault on the occupied city.50 
By striking at the port of Inchon, the US military brilliantly launched over 70,000 troops 
directly into the area surrounding Seoul.51 Although Kim Il Sung had been warned by the 
Chinese government that the US would most likely attempt this type of attack at one of 
the ports near Seoul, the choice of the difficult Inchon over other ports took the North 
Koreans by surprise and troops were able to infiltrate the occupied city.52 As one of the 
operations commanders explained, "Inchon may have been the worst possible place we 
could bring in an amphibious assault, but it was also the only place where our assault 
would carry out its purpose: to cut off and destroy the enemy."53 Echoing the attack that 
had overcome the ROK in June, Inchon Landing altered the war significantly. After the 
success at Inchon it seemed possible that once again that Korea would be reunified, but 
now it would be under the guidance of a capitalist government.   
Chul-Hoe Koo, one of the prisoners mentioned in chapter II, describes the 
panicked executions of political prisoners following the Inchon Landing. Arrested by 
occupation forces because of his reputation as a conservative reporter, Koo describes how 
the anxious communist forces dealt with prisoners unable to join the retreat north. The 
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officers assured Koo and other sickly prisoners from the infirmary that “we are taking 
you to the army hospital to protect you. If we left you here, you may be massacred when 
the Americans and the remnant National army come.”54 Rather than actually moving Koo 
and his sick fellow prisoners, they were told instead to line up and abruptly executed.55 
While Koo was able to hide under a friend’s body and eventually escape, there are 
countless other incidents where communist soldiers chose to execute prisoners rather than 
release those who had only committed political crimes. With the enemy at the gates, 
North Korean soldiers forced prisoners to move to Pyongyang.56 In figure 4, American 
soldiers can be seen hiding from North Korean snipers during the chaotic battle to end the 
occupation. 
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Fig. 4. Dresfor, Max. US Marines hiding from communist snipers. Sep 27, 1950. 
Digital image, The Atlantic, Washington, D.C. 
 https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2016/02/the-extraordinary-career-of-
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 With mines in the streets and executions behind doors, the liberation of Seoul was 
much more violent than the communist takeover three months before. UN forces from 
countries other than the US and South Korea complained about frequently witnessing 
unnecessary violence from ROK soldiers.57 Reginald Thompson, a British journalist who 
had been accompanying UN forces in Korea, remarked darkly that the ROK army 
behaved so violently that “few people can have suffered so terrible a liberation.”58 Even 
American troops vocalized their distaste with the violence in Seoul. One Arkansas marine 
named Carl Lamb has spoken out about his experience during Seoul’s liberation, where 
he was severely traumatized after witnessing a basement filled with the massacred bodies 
of North Korean POWs.59 As figure 5 reveals, the battle devastated the city.  
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By September 25th, 1950, American and South Korean control of Seoul had been 
secured as US tanks poured into the area and communist forces fled north. With North 
Korean troops out of the way, the US and ROK governments began to concentrate on 
restoring the occupied areas.  Experience in Germany and Japan had prepared the US 
army for the daunting feat of persuading local civilians to turn against the ideology of the 
defeated government.60 With anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist education heavily pushed 
on Seoul’s citizens throughout the three months of occupation, American and ROK 
forces worked to counter it. In figure 6, the state of Seoul’s citizens after the battle can be 
seen. 
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Fig. 6. Associated Press. Civilians in Seoul During the “Liberation.” Oct. 
7th, 1950. Digital image. Boston Globe, Boston. 
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Efforts to cleanse the area of communism was termed “reorientation,” as 
American and ROK forces worked to erase the negativity the communist government had 
attached to the capitalistic governments.61 The American and ROK governments again 
borrowed post-WWII terminology by referring to the retaking of Seoul and the 
occupation of Pyongyang as “reconstruction.”62 Armstrong reveals that ROK forces 
began almost immediately to remove the communist cultural elements (such as posters) 
that had been left behind; the anti-communist government appointed painters to destroy 
communist murals and also musicians and theater directors to create anti-communist 
propaganda.63 Focusing more on utilizing religion to combat the remains of communism, 
US forces made plans to “unleash missionaries on North Korea.”64 With so many of 
North Korea’s missionaries being recent refugees who had fled the regime, it is 
unsurprising that American forces were able to utilize their situation to fight against the 
widespread support of communism. With the South Korean government back in control, 
communist sympathizers (such as the man in figure 7) became the targets of post-
occupation vengeance. 
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As the fighting in Seoul died down, American forces in Korea established an 
agency to deal with the rumors of massacres and executions. Only three months after the 
beginning of the war and barely days after Seoul’s liberation, the War Crimes 
Commission was established within the city. 65 The US military had learned from WWI 
and II that waiting to investigate until the end of the conflict would only make things 
more difficult. In the military’s prior attempts to convict war criminals “many of the 
witnesses had disappeared, and much of the documentary evidence had disappeared.”66 
Rather than uncovering incidents like No Gun Ri though, the WCC focused largely on 
the communists, accusing the North Koreans of massacring Seoul’s civilians during the 
final weeks of the occupation.67 While it is true that the American military and 
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Fig. 7. Dresfor, Max. One Man Striking a Supposed Communist 
Sympathizer. Sep 27, 1950. Digital image, The Atlantic, Washington, 
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government hid their own atrocities from both the public and their South Korean allies, 
the WCC’s wartime findings further illustrate the madness of the final weeks of the 
occupation. What the communists had considered to be a liberation in June, had been 
calm compared to the traumatizing events that took place during the September 
liberation.   
 
Conclusion 
 By the end of the communist occupation of Seoul, it seemed certain that 
reunification under anti-communist forces was about to occur. General MacArthur, 
falsely confident after the success at Inchon, moved his forces into North Korea while 
bragging that US troops could be home by Christmas.68 Instead, Chinese troops flooded 
into Korea and Seoul suffered a second (but shorter) occupation while the opportunity for 
Korean reunification lapsed. Just as the ROK would have faced total defeat if not for the 
hasty arrival of American troops months earlier, the Chinese Communist Party thwarted 
American plans to reunite the country and eradicate Korean communism by sending over 
100,000 troops to the peninsula.69 With the massive numbers overwhelming US and ROK 
troops, the front lines of the war eventually returned to the 38th parallel, beginning a 
stalemate that would last for several years before the armistice.  
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As the first major conflict of the Cold War, the Korean War’s own violence 
would last for three destructive years. In reality though, the two Korean states remain at 
war, with combat essentially paused since the 1953 signing of an armistice agreement. 
While the armistice did initiate a cease-fire, officially the Korean peninsula has been 
locked into the state of a civil war for over six decades.70 The three years of fighting 
devastated Korea, transforming its temporary division at the 38th parallel into a 
permanent border. The death toll from the American and ROK liberation of South Korea 
included 111,000 South Koreans, 2,954 Americans, and possibly around 70,000 North 
Koreans.71 As a war with no foreseeable end, the Korean War continues to haunt the two 
states, a situation that has encouraged the persistence of Cold War rhetoric.   
With the ongoing nature of the Korean War, topics that focus on events where the 
North Korean government was the major player (such as the occupation) remained 
obscured by the war’s politics. Without open access to North Korean documents, a large 
degree of the occupation remains a mystery. At the same time, the anti-communist stance 
of the South Korean government has also hindered discussions on North Korean topics, 
promoting a sanitized version of the war that hinges on the communists’ role as the 
antagonist.  
Fortunately, these ongoing consequences of the political situation have been 
unable to completely alter the memories of the occupation. The political situation and 
ideological nature of the war has plainly restricted the public from important details, 
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71 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 707. 
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while also influencing how interviewees discuss their memories, but the effects appear to 
be surprisingly insignificant. Despite the influences of politics and the passing of time, 
the recollections of those interviewed seem primarily impacted by their actual experience 
more than anything afterward. From the chaos to their mundane experiences, the 1950s 
interviews are similar to the Korean-American interviews that were conducted half a 
decade later. While the rhetoric used to discuss the war is considerably different (as the 
early interviews condemn the communists more regularly) the story remains largely the 
same: The first few days were chaotic and many who feared the communists fled south, 
then the communists controlled Seoul for a few months, and later the occupation ended 
violently. The interviewees’ attitudes have been softened somewhat, but their 
recollections of the occupation are strikingly similar. 
The commonalities between the interviewees’ experiences suggest that the big 
question should not be a politically loaded inquiry over whether communism was 
beneficial to Seoul. Instead, scholars should focus on how Korean civilians survived the 
trauma of experiencing the physical consequences of the ongoing ideological conflicts. It 
was not communism itself that uprooted so many ordinary Koreans, despite the goal of 
The Reds Take a City’s attempts to suggest this, but the complex situation created by 
post-WWII decolonization on top of Cold War politics. Both the communists and their 
enemies contributed to the misery of those ordinary citizens caught living within the 
grand stage of the Korean War. 
While this thesis discusses the occupation of Seoul in as much detail as possible, 
it must be further stressed that the event remains largely un-studied and underestimated. 
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With the already mentioned political issues meaning that the communist side of the war 
remains hidden beyond the 38th parallel, historians are, for the most part, confined to 
sources already well-known to academics. The opening of former Soviet archives in the 
1990s gave scholars studying the Korean War a taste of the future, as historians could 
access communist documents that had been classified for decades. If reunification should 
occur, or the more likely scenario of improved relations with North Korea, the 
communist occupation of Seoul will be a much less complicated topic to study. Scholars 
will be able to digest the details regarding the communist design for Seoul, while also 
enjoying the details lost to outsiders as the DPRK fled South Korea and returned north.  
Despite the lack of information on the event, and the political and ideological 
influences present, the occupation of Seoul remains a significant period of the Korean 
War, especially to the Koreans who experienced it. As the historical record of academic 
works have left the occupation as a mere footnote, the memories of ordinary Koreans 
further exemplify the occupation’s significance. From those who fled Seoul in June, to 
those who remained in the city throughout the “summer of terror,” the occupation clearly 
left a substantial impression on their memories, as so many oral histories prominently 
feature the event. Whether or not historians begin to acknowledge it, the occupation 
remains one of the Korean War’s most fascinating and exciting periods.  
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